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A considerable amount of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse of children and women 
committed by the personnel of United Nations peace support operations have been brought to 
the  attention of the public, especially in recent years. As multiple actors are involved in 
United Nations peace support operations, i.a. the United Nations itself and Troop 
Contributing States, the question of attribution of responsibility is highly important – either as 
multiple responsibility or as the sole responsibility of one entity.  
    This thesis will investigate the issue of international responsibility and examine who 
carries the onus for such misconduct. The issue of international responsibility in the context 
of United Nations peace support operations is not merely theoretically interesting, but it also 
holds practical consequences for victims wishing to file a legal case against the United 
Nations as with the current so-called Cholera Complaint.   
 
Key Words: Peace Support Operation, International Responsibility, Attribution of Conduct, 
Effective Control and Command, Human Rights Violation, Human Rights Obligation, Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse, Redress and Compensation.      
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Chapter 1:  General concepts 
1 Introduction  
Contemporary Peace Support Operations (PSOs)
1
 may include different actors playing 
different roles and holding different functions. Two important primary actors on the 
international level are the United Nations (UN) and the Troop Contributing States (TCSs)
2
 
and they are both considered in this thesis. In principle, they are bound by International 
Human Rights Law (HR)
3
 obligations flowing from different legal sources.
4
 Such 
obligations, prohibitions on sexual exploitation and abuses (SEAs)
5
 of women and children
6
 
in particular, have been violated by the personnel of PSO forces on a number of occasions.  It 
was first documented in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo in the early 1990s and then later in 
Mozambique, Cambodia, East Timor and Liberia.
7
 For example, according to an Amnesty 
International report, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in the 1990s, "UN peacekeepers 
helped support sex trafficking as customers of brothels relying on forced prostitution".
8
  
                                                           
1 One of the examples of UN PSOs in the past is the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). It was 
established “in July 1991 to verify implementation of all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente 
Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, including a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed 
forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other 
economic and social issues.” The mission was terminated in 1995. 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusal.htm . Access 28 Apr. 2014 at 14:00 hrs; United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is an example of current PSOs. “UNFICYP is one of the longest-running UN 
Peacekeeping missions. It was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities on the island and bring about a return to normal conditions. The Mission’s work is based on four components 
that work together closely: the military, UN Police (UNPOL), the Civil Affairs Branch and Administration, which supports 
all activities. The Mission counts almost 1100 personnel. Since 1964, almost 180 UN personnel have lost their lives while 
serving in UNFICYP.” http://www.unficyp.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=778&tt=graphic&lang=l1. Access 28 Apr. 2014 at 
14:00 hrs      
2 Larsen, Kjetil M. "The Human Rights Treaty Obligations of Peacekeepers" Cambridge, 2012, p.11.  
3 “Human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, national or ethnic 
origin, colour, religion, language, or any other status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without discrimination. 
These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and indivisible.Universal human rights are often expressed and guaranteed 
by law, in the forms of treaties, customary international law, general principles and other sources of international law.” 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/pages/whatarehumanrights.aspx. Access 28 Apr. 2014 at 15:00 hrs.; see  also 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/hr_law.shtml . Access 28 Apr. 2014 at 15:30 hrs.   
4 Ibid. 
5  It includes all forms of coercive and unlawful sexual activities, prostitution, pornography and trafficking.  For more 
information about the definition of SEA see Muntarbhorn, Vitit "Article 34: Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of 
Children" in: A, Alen, J. Vande Lanotte, E. Verhellen, F. Ange, E. Berghmans and M. Verheyde (Eds.) A commentary on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child , Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007.1-41, pp. 1-4; see also 
Stockholm Declaration " First World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children: Declaration and 
Agenda for Action" 27-31 August 1996, Stockholm, Sweden, para.5. Available at: 
http://www.ecpat.net/sites/default/files/stockholm_declaration_1996.pdf.   
6 According to the Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), "child means every human being below the 
age of eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier".  
7 Defeis, Elizabeth F. "UN Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploitation: An End to Impunity" Washington University 
Global Studies Law University, 2008, Vol. 7. No. 2, 185-214, p. 187.  
8 Novic, Natalie "When Those Meant to Keep the Peace Commit Sexualized Violence" Women under Siege, 25 May 2012: 
http://www.womenundersiegeproject.org/blog/entry/when-those-meant-to-keep-the-peace-commit-sexualized-violence. 
Access: 23 January 2013 at 16:23 hrs.   
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    However, it "was brought to the spot light of public attention in 2002 pursuing allegations 
of widespread abuse of refugee and internally displaced women and children by humanitarian 
workers and peacekeepers in West Africa".
9
 This was followed up by, for example, the 
revelation of sexual abuses in 2004 by a number of peacekeeping personnel in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
10
 sexual abuse of a 15-year old girl in Liberia and 
some multiple assaults cases in Haiti.
11
 According to the Zeid Report dated 25 March 2005, 
in the DRC, SEAs involved "the exchange of sex for money (on average $1-$3 per 
encounter), for food (for immediate consumption or to barter later) or for jobs (especially 
affecting daily workers)".
12
 Much more distressing were acts of rape disguised as prostitution 
in which victims were given food or money as a gift by personnel of PSOs after being 
assaulted in order to give the rape the appearance of consensual transaction and prostitution 
rather than rape.
13
 During 2004-2006, the UN investigated 319 members of PSOs who were 
suspected of having committed SEAs, and consequently the UN disciplined 179 people for 
SEA including soldiers, civilians and police officers.
14
 Notably, in 2005 alone 296 complaints 
were lodged against peacekeeping personnel.
15
  
    However, SEAs continued. In 2006, the UN reported 357 allegations of SEAs by the UN 
PSOs personnel.
16
 In 2008, according to a report by the United Kingdom based non-profit 
organisation Save the Children, UN peacekeepers in Haiti abused a young Haitian girl 
sexually.
17
 Although the numbers are down to 74 reported allegations in 2011,
18
 it still 
existed. As a case in point, five Uruguayan UN PSOs personnel, who raped a Haitian 
teenager, were accused in January 2012.
19
 Additionally, "[i]n March [2012], two UN 
                                                           
9 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse "Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuse by UN, NGO and INGO Personnel: a self–assessment" Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 52, October 
2011:http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-52/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-by-un-ngo-and-ingo-
personnel-a-self-assessment. 
10  UN General Assembly "Letter dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General 
Assembly" Fifty-ninth session, Agenda item 77, Comprehensive review of the whole question, of peacekeeping operations in 
all their aspects including "A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations" prepared by Prince Zeid Ra' ad Zeid Al-Hussein (hereinafter Zeid Report), UN. Doc. A/59/710, 
25 March 2005, 1-41, p. 1, Available at: 
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/247/90/PDF/N0524790.pdf?OpenElement  
11 Sweetser, C. "Providing Effective Remedies to Victims of Abuse by Peacekeeping" University Law Review, Vol. 83, New 
York University School of Law (2008) 1643- 1677, p. 1645. 
12Zeid Report, op. cit. p. 8.  
13 Ibid. 
14 European Parliament "Implication UN forces in Sexual Abuses in Liberia and in Haiti" European Parliament Resolution 
on the Involvement of UN Forces in Sexual Abuse in Liberia and Haiti, Official Journal of European Union (European 
Parliament Resolution hereinafter), 23.12.2006, C 317 E , 899-901, p.900  
15 Sweetser, C., op. cit. p. 1645. 
16 It appears that the amount of allegations supersede that of individuals who have been investigated during 2004-2006. It 
therefore seems that multiple charges typically must have related to the same person, or that the perpetrator was unknown.  





peacekeepers from Pakistan were found guilty of raping a 14-year-old boy in Haiti. They 
were sentenced to just a year of prison in their home country".
20
  
     All in all, as the number of PSOs and their personnel grown, widespread accounts of 
inappropriate behaviour and SEAs carried out by PSO personnel have been reported around 
the world, notably in Haiti, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia, East Timor, 
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
21
 As Muna Ndulo, a Cornell constitutional law 
scholar, points out, UN peacekeepers have fathered an estimated 24,500 babies in Cambodia 
and 6,600 in Liberia – as a result of SEAs. Subsequently, they have abandoned their children 
at the end of their employment.
22
  
    These reports have motivated me to work on my chosen topic - Responsibility
23
 under 
International Law for Human Rights Violations Committed by the Personnel of United 
Nations Peace Support Operations: Sexual Exploitation and Abuses of Children and Women. 
    It would seem that this issue is of great importance to both HR and public international law 
in general, and that it might need further attention. Hence, the responsibility of the UN under 
international law and the issue of how to redress victims will be considered in this thesis 
    The relevance of this topic to peace studies is well shown by the fact that peacekeeping 
personnel are supposed to protect the people who are stuck in a conflict situation and help 
them obtain peace. Simply put, peacekeepers help the parties to a conflict to resolve their 
conflicts peacefully.
24
 In the words of  the European Parliament: The "whole purpose of 
peacekeeping missions is to help countries ravaged by civil or international conflict restore 
stability, guarantee public security and install the rule of law".
25
 However, when they act to 
the contrary and violate HR themselves, an important issue is the redressing of victims. In 
                                                           
20 Ibid.,  For more examples regarding conviction/ accusing personnel of PSOs forces see: 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-13/Haiti-UN-peacekeepers/53515134/1 ; 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-18030350 . 
21 Novic, Natalie, op. cit. 
22  Ndulo, Muna "The United Nations Reponses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers 
during Peacekeeping Missions" Vol. 27, No. 1, Berkeley Journal of International Law (2009) 127-161, pp. 129,157.  
23 One may argue that the term 'responsibility' should be replaced by the term 'accountability' since the latter is a more open 
and broader model. However, I use these two terms as synonym. Thus, wherever the term 'accountable'/accountability is 
used it means 'responsible/responsibility' and vice versa. For more information in this respect, see Dekker, Ige F. 
"Accountability of International Organizations: An Evolving Legal Concept" in Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, 
and Schmitt Pierre, (eds.), Oxford: intersentia, 2010, 21-36.        
24 United Nations, Peacekeeping, From the Millennium Report (Millennium Report hereinafter), p. 2, Available at: 
http://www.un.org/cyberUNSChoolbus/briefing/peacekeeping/peacekeeping.pdf  
25 European Parliament resolution, op. cit. part E. 
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order to give the victim proper compensation, as opposed to ex gratia payments
26
, 
responsibility must be established for actors involved in these PSOs.  
    The legal foundation for PSOs lies somewhere between Chapter VI and VII of the United 
Nations Charter (UNC)
27
; as the Millennium Report stated: "Chapter VI outlines specific 
means which countries may use to settle disputes: negotiations, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional institutions or arrangements or 
other peaceful means. Chapter VII provides for enforcement action by UN Member States, 
including the use of armed force or other collective measures for dealing with 'threats to 
peace' ".
28
 Therefore, the UNC allows the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to deploy troops and other personnel of its PSOs, 
in general, around the world. This thesis only considers the violation of the rights of those 
people who are supposed to be protected by the personnel of UN PSOs – i.e. blue berets or 
blue helmets, and not the UNSC authorized coalitions of the willing. It will moreover not 
address the issue of SEA between personnel belonging to a UN PSO. In other words, only the 
HR of the civilian population in the area of deployment of PSOs forces is considered in this 
thesis.  
    Observance of both women's and children's rights is one of the important concerns of the 
UN and the UNSC in particular.
29
 For example, UNSC resolution No. 1820 (2008) condemns 
sexual violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict and post-conflict 
and calls upon all parties to armed conflicts for the cessation of such acts.
30
 Furthermore, it 
"[u]rges appropriate regional and sub-regional bodies in particular to consider developing and 
implementing policies, activities, and advocacy for the benefit of women and girls affected 
by sexual violence in armed conflict".
31
 Thus, as the report of the UN Secretary-General on 
the protection of civilians in armed conflicts states: "[R]esolution 1820 (2008) signalled the 
council's strengthened commitment to address sexual violence in conflict",
32
 and the UNSC 
has also taken measures to enhance protection of women and children as the most vulnerable 
                                                           
26 When something has been done ex gratia, it has been done voluntarily, out of kindness or grace. In law, an ex gratia 
payment is a payment made without the giver recognising any liability or legal obligation. In other word, “it done from a 
sense of moral obligation rather than because of any legal requirement.”  
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/ex-gratia . Access 20 Apr. 2014 at 13:00 hrs. 
27 Charter of the United Nations (UNC), San Francisco, adopted 26 June1945. 1 UNTS XVI (entered into force 24 October 
1946). 
28 Millennium Report, op. cit.; Also see UNC, Chapter VI & VII. 
29 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, UN 
Doc. S/2009/277-29 May 2009, pp. 2-3. Available at: http://www.poa-iss.org/CASAUpload/ELibrary/S-2009-277en.pdf .  
30 Security Council Resolution 1820, Adopted at its 5916th meeting on Women, Peace and Security, UN Doc. S/RES/1820 
(2008) 19 June 2008.1-5, p. 2. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CAC%20S%20RES%201820.pdf . 
31  Ibid. p. 4.  
32 UNSC Resolution, S/2009/277, op. cit. p.3. 
5 
 
parts of society affected by conflict.
33
 Therefore, violations of these rights by the personnel of 
PSOs do achieve the attention of the UN itself, the public and also non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Saving the Children. Hence, 
the matter of application and responsibility for these HR violations has become the 
occupation of many scholars. 
    This thesis assesses to whom the responsibility for the violation of HR is to be attributed 
under international law, and it argues that different actors involved in PSOs may have a 
degree of responsibility under international law. This may open up avenues for victims to 
access some form of compensation, and owing to the fact that responsibility without the 
establishment of a right for victims to reparation is relatively meaningless, how to redress 
victims is the other issue which will be covered by this thesis. It also considers the 
responsibility for TCSs in regard to HR violation committed by the personnel of UN PSOs.   
    Actually, there are difficulties in establishing responsibility for the UN since there are 
limitations on bringing a case against it before a third party dispute settlement system. For 
instance, according to the statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), only states can be 
parties in cases before the court.
34
 However, theoretically, the UN and a State may agree 
upon referring a dispute to an ad hoc international tribunal to have it settled through 
arbitration. They would nevertheless seem likely to settle disputes through another system. 
An agreement between the UN and a State which provides that in case of disputes, the 
UNGA or other related organ will ask the ICJ for an advisory opinion on the point at issue. If 
it is agreed in advance that this opinion will be accepted as decisive by both parties, the 
court's opinion will be binding on both the UN and the State.
35
  
    Furthermore, none of the HR committees or courts seems to allow for cases to be brought 
against Inter-governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the UN. However, this does not 
answer the question of whether national courts are allowed to try cases against the UN or UN 
personnel. Another difficulty regarding the responsibility of the UN is that it may be argued 
that as PSOs troops are composed of militaries of Member States and that they therefore do 
not belong to the UN. Hence, the responsibility of the UN is called into question, at least as a 
sole responsibility. Should they nevertheless be seen as for these purposes only representing 
                                                           
33Ibid. 
34 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Status hereinafter), Annex to UN Charter, United Nations, 1945,  1 UNTS 
XVI Article 34, Part 1.
 
35 Thirlway, Hugh "The International Court of Justice" in Evans, M. (ed.) "International Law" 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford   
university Press, 2010, 586-614, p.608.     
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the UN, their function as UN employees grants them functional immunity. This immunity 
typically follows from Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). Thus, they cannot be tried by 
national courts of the host State. One may nevertheless argue that according to the traditional 
theory of employer responsibility, the UN is responsible for its personnel's wrongdoings. The 
question is thus which forum may try the person - TCS courts, host States courts, or third 
States courts. Indeed, the potential responsibility of the host State is also one of many related 
issues which should perhaps have been looked into. However, due to the limited scope of this 
thesis, civil and criminal responsibility of perpetrators, and the responsibility of the host State 
will regretfully not be considered.
36
    
2 Research Questions  
In this regard, the main question is who is responsible for the violation of HR during PSOs? 
    Similarly, the following sub-questions and their answers constitute the different chapters of 
the thesis: 
1- How is HR binding on the UN? 
2- Under which sources of international law and to what extent is the UN responsible for 
HR violations by its PSOs personnel? 
3- Under which sources of international law and to what extent are TCSs responsible for 
HR violations by the personnel of UN PSOs? 
4- Is it possible to have a claim against the UN adjudicated or otherwise handled in an 
authoritative manner? 
5- How can victims be redressed and are there any examples of victims having been 
properly redressed?  
6- Is finally the onus of misconduct undertaken by PSOs personnel and the redressing of 
victims on the UN or on the TCSs? What are the suggestions for proper redressing 
mechanism? 
 
                                                           
36 For more information in this regard see O'Brien, Melanie "Protectors on Trial? Prosecuting Peacekeepers for War Crimes 





In the words of the Oxford English Dictionary, method means "a special form of procedure 
adopted in any branch of mental activity, whether for the purpose of teaching and exposition 
or for that of investigation and inquiry".
37
 Conducting research in international law might be 
a rather difficult exercise even for professional practitioners, owing to the fact that the 
sources of international law are enormously vast and since there is no single code of legal 
rules, or single court whose decisions can be relied upon as all-encompassing and imperative. 
As Rosenne points out, this is due to the substance of the material being diffused,
38
 to a large 
extent; the broad variety of primary source-materials to be examined; the many languages in 
which these materials are written; the ever increasing amount of legal literature; and also the 
essential characteristics of public international law itself which is the law of coordination but 
not subordination.
39
 Therefore, international law requires its own proper methodological 
techniques which are widely different from other disciplines such as social science or 
economy.   
    International law is a normative science that, the issues raised in the former paragraph 
aside, has its own unique and rigorous approach to analysing and solving questions. There are 
at least seven methods for legal research representing the major methods of contemporary 
international legal scholarship, excluding methods which may have been utilized by scholars 
in the past, but additionally there are also other useful ways of addressing international legal 
scholarship, such as humanistic or philosophical approaches. However, due to space 
constraints this thesis does not cover more than one of them, but in general they are: Legal 
positivism, the New Haven school, international legal process, critical legal studies, 
international law and international relations, feminist jurisprudence, and law and 
economics.
40
 Of these the majority applies a modified version of legal positivism with the 




    It is worth noting, however, that the classic view of positivism means that there are no 
other rules than these which States have agreed to through treaties, customary law, and other 
                                                           
37  Oxford English Dictionary 690(second edition, 1989). 
38  When international law meets other sciences it turns into an interdisciplinary field of study such as commercial/business 
international law, philosophy of law, or law and sociology. 
39  Rosenne, Shabtai, "Practice and Methods of International Law" Oceana Publications, Inc., New York, 1984, pp.1-2.  
40 Ratner, S., Slaughter, A. M. "Symposium On Method In International Law" Appraising the Methods of International Law: 
a Prospectus for Readers, Vol. 93 Am. J. Int'l L. (1999), 291- 423, pp.291, 293. 
41  Ibid. p.293. 
8 
 
forms of consent in international law.
 
This view associates law with the expression of State 
will. That is, international norms are established by the consent of the States (their collective 
will) on that norm. However, the modified version of positivism is not necessarily fully 
associated with State voluntarism. It does not authorize a State to change its mind and 
withdraw its consent unilaterally after the collective will of States reaches consent on the 
content of an international rule.
42
 As Slaughter and Ratner states, "for the modern 
representatives of analytical positivism, the unity of the legal system, embodied by the 
Grundnorm (basic norm) or the "unity of primary and secondary sources", is more important 
than the emanation of law from concrete acts of will".
43
  Customary international law is then 
a rigorous separation of legal norms from nonlegal factors such as moral principles, political 
ideologies, natural reasons and so forth.
44
 
     Materials for such an analysis are found in i.a. the International Law Commission (ILC) 
documents, treaties such as the UN Charter, Resolutions of UNGA or the UNSC, etc. Take, 
for example, the ICJ statute. According to the UNC Article 92, the ICJ is the main judicial 
organ of the UN and it is established by UNC.
45
 According to Article 38 of the ICJ statute, 
and for the purpose of that context, international law has three main sources, namely, 
international treaties and conventions, customary law, and the general principals of law. 
Additionally, there are two subsidiary sources, namely, judicial decisions and 
teaching/doctrine.
46
Actually, this list is held to reflect the main sources of relevance to 
international law in general and should be regarded as "pointing towards materials where the 
answer in terms of public international law can be found".
47
However, there are other valid 
sources of international law which are not mentioned by Article 38 of the ICJ statute. This 
category includes in particular binding resolutions of international organizations such as the 
resolutions of the UNSC
48
, and unilateral obligations
49
. It also includes soft laws (nonbinding 
documents) such as resolutions and reports of the UNGA, and the reports of the UN ILC. 
They might reflect customary international law and take part in the process of establishing 
international law; however they are not binding in themselves.  
                                                           
42 Ibid. pp. 293,303-304. 
43 Ibid. p. 304. 
44 Ibid. p. 303. 
45  ICJ Status, op. cit. Art. 1. 
46 Ibid. Art. 38.    
47 Rosenne, Shabtai, op. cit. p. 18.   
48 Zwanenburg, Marten, op, cit. p.3. 
49 See ILC, Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, 
Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_9_2006.pdf.      
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     The methodology of international law is therefore the ways to identify and apply primary 
(treaties, customary law and the general principals of law) and secondary (judicial decisions 
and teaching/doctrine) sources to the question at hand. The link between a legal theory and a 
legal method is thus one between the abstract and the applied.
 50
  
     From the perspective of the thesis title, customary law is the main sources to be used due 
to the fact that intergovernmental organization like the UN cannot be party of the relevant 
human rights treaties
51
 and there is no general treaty about the responsibility of the UN under 
international law as an intergovernmental organization for wrongful acts. Also, the work of 
the ILC – of relevance both for the responsibility of the UN and States - such as Draft 
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally wrongful Acts 2001 (DARS)
52
 and 
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 2011 (DARIO)
53
, ICJ 
advisory opinions, and the resolutions and reports of the UNGA, may be rich sources for the 
project. Of relevance to the responsibility of sending States, in addition to the customary law, 
are naturally treaties they might be parties to, like the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)
54
, and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
55
. It is 
worthwhile here to point out that wherever treaty or convention provisions are used in this 
thesis, they will be interpreted on the basis of the legal regime found in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 VCLT)
56
. Article 31 (1) here provides that "[a] 
                                                           
50 Ratner, S., Slaughter A. M., op. cit. p.292. 
51 Article 59 of ECHR amended by protocol No. 14 Article 17. The latter reads that:" The European Union may accede to 
this Convention." Protocol No. 14 to ECHR, Strasbourg, 13.v. 2004, Available at: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/194.htm; The European Union is in the process of negotiating the 
framework for its accession to the ECHR.   
52 ILC  "Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001" (DARS) adopted at its 53rd 
session, in 2001 and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of ILC's report covering the work of that session. The 
report which also contains commentaries on DARS appears in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II 
Part Two. Text reproduced as it appears in the annex to General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, and 
corrected by document A/56/49 (Vol.I)/ Corr.4. Available at:  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_6_2001.pdf.  
53 ILC "Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 2011" (DARIO) adopted at its 63rd session and 
submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the ILC's report covering the work of that session (A/66/10 para. 87). The 
report will be appeared in Year book of the ILC, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two. Available at:  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_11_2011.pdf. 
54 "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" (ICCPR) Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on 19 December 1966. Its optional protocol also adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 19 December 
1996, Treaty Series, Vol. 999, I-14668, 172-346. Available at:  http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/3ae6b3aa0.pdf.  
55 "European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" known as "European Convention 
of Human Rights" (ECHR) Adopted by Council of Europe, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 
1950, ETS 5, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html    
56  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969 VCLT), 23 May 1969, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, I-




treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 























                                                           
57 Ibid, p.340, Article 31 (1); these parts of the 1969 VCLT are international customary law. 
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Chapter 2: International Governmental Organization, Responsibility, and Peace 
Support Operations 
In order to define PSOs and give an overview of the issue of responsibility for the conduct
58
 
of the personnel of PSOs, the concept of international organization to which this personnel 
and these operations belong should be explained.  
1 International Organization 
International organizations are categorized into two groups, IGOs and NGOs. For the purpose 
of this thesis, however, international organization only covers international governmental 
organization and not international association such as international NGOs and international 
public corporations. These two categories should not be conflated.
59
  
    There are three criteria by which an international organization is to be distinguished. First 
of all, the entity shall be prevalently composed of other international organization, or/and 
entities, or/and States. The other important criterion is that the entity must be established 
under international law and the instrument of the establishment should be either a treaty, 
resolution of an international organization, resolution of a conference of States, or by the joint 
unilateral acts of States. Last but not least, the entity must possess independent internal 
organs having a separate and autonomous will from that of its members. In other words, the 




Under international law, responsibility is a consequence of the breaching or not-observance 
of international norms and obligations attributable to a legal person.
61
 Therefore, it seems to 
me that an entity should be considered as a legal person when legal personality is ascribable 
to that entity.
62
 In other words, by attributing international responsibility to an international 
organization, legal personality must be ascribed to that international organization due to the 
fact that international legal personality is the ability of bearing rights and obligations/duties 
                                                           
58  There is a discussion regarding on-duty and off-duty conduct which is not cantered to this thesis. It will therefore not be 
covered here. For further readings see Leck, Christopher "International Responsibility in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Command and Control Arrangement and the Attribution of Conduct" Vol. 10, Melbourne Journal of 
International Law (2009) 1-19, pp.5-6.
 
59 Akande, Dapo "International Organizations" in Evans, M. (ed.) "International Law" 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford university 
Press, 2010, 252-283, p. 254. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Zwanenburg, Marten "Accountability of Peace Support Operations", Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 
International Humanitarian Law Series, Vol. 9, 2005, p.51. 





 So, it appears that the breaching of international obligations held by 
the entity invites legal consequences which lead to the accountability of the delinquent legal 
person.  
    Article 3 of DARIO states that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of an international 
organization entails the international responsibility of that organization",
64
 And under Article 
4 of DARIO, an international organization is internationally responsible for conduct 
consisting of an action or omission, if that conduct or omission "is attributable to that 




     Hence, legal personality, the elements of attribution and the breach of international law 
will be discussed in this thesis. 
1-1-1 Legal Personality and its Sources   
Therefore, the above criteria, the first one in particular, have been of crucial importance in 
order to recognize an IGO as such. Additionally, as Naert points out, there is no generally 
accepted definition of the term international organization, but several non-identical terms are 
used to describe its legal status, such as subject of international law, international legal 
capacity, legal person, and international legal personality.
66
  
    Lacking any treaty definition, the attention should be drawn to the ICJ Reparations for 
Injuries Advisory Opinion.
67
 According to this opinion, international personality means the 
capacity of bearing rights and duties and the right to present an international claim,
68
 in other 
words it means "the capacity to operate upon an international plane".
69
 So, the Court 
acknowledged that the very international organization studied here - the UN - is an 
organization which possesses international personality and is capable of availing itself of 
obligations incumbent upon its members.
70
 International legal personality will be discussed 
more in later paragraphs.     
                                                           
63 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. p. 65. 
64 DARIO, op. cit. Article 3.   
65  Ibid. Article 4. 
66 Naert, Frederik, "International Law Aspects of the EU's security and Defence Policy" with a Particular Focus on the Law 
of Armed Conflict and Human Rights, Intersentia, 2010, p. 262.  
67 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Services of the United Nations (Reparation for Injuries hereinafter), Advisory 
Opinion: I.C.J. Reports, 1949, 174-186. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/4/1835.pdf.  
68  Ibid. pp.177-179. 
69  Ibid. p. 179. 
28 Ibid. pp. 177-180. 
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As mentioned in preceding paragraphs, before establishing international legal responsibility 
for an intergovernmental organization, referred to as an international organization hereinafter, 
legal personality must be recognized for the international organization in question. The legal 
personality of the international organization studied here - the UN - must be recognized in the 
domestic law of the Member states under Article 104 of the UNC.
 71
 But the UNC is silent on 
the international legal personality of this organization – its bearing of rights and duties which 
emanate from international law. There is moreover no treaty basis expressing that this 
international organization possesses international legal personality. Yet, customary 
international law has generated principles which concern issues such as international legal 
personality and responsibility.
72
 Once customary international law, which is binding on all 
States, ascribes some traits such as personality to an organization, a subject of international 
law is created with rights and obligations.
73
  It is perhaps needless to say that one of the 
subsidiary sources of international law are advisory opinions of the ICJ. The way these 
advisory opinions reflect the law, indicates well how the ICJ will handle a similar case 
between States in the future.
 74
   
    Before going through the ICJ advisory opinions regarding international legal personality, 
the different schools of thoughts in this regard should be mentioned. There are two schools of 
thought as regards how international legal personality of an international organization is to be 
established, the inductive
75
 and the objective approach. According to the former, the legal 
personality of an international organization follows from the capacities, powers, rights, and 
duties conferred on that organization in its constituent instrument and developed in practice. 
Hence, it will only have personality if its members intended it to have such personality or if it 
can be asserted that such personality is necessary for the fulfilment of the functions ascribed 
to it by its members.
76
 According to the latter approach, the organization has international 
legal personality as long as certain objective criteria set out by law are fulfilled. These 
criteria, as have been mentioned in preceding paragraphs, are as follows: composing 
predominately of States or/and other international organizations or/and other entities, being 
established under international law, and possessing autonomous organs which have a 
                                                           
71 Article 104 Charter of United Nations: The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal 
capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes. 
72 Akande, Dapo, op. cit. pp. 257-258.  
73 Ibid. p.259. 
74 Ibid. pp. 255-256. 
75 Some Scholars call it as subjective school of thought for example Zwanenburg states that there are two theories explaining 
international legal personality of international organization, namely, objective and subjective theories (Zwanenburg, Marten, 
pp. 65-66)  instead of objective and inductive theories.   
76  Akande, Dapo. op. cit. pp. 256-257. 
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separated will from that of the members.  Thus, personality is under this approach not derived 
from the will of the members as such, but from the presence of the criteria stated in the 
definition of an international organization.
 77
  
    Returning to the ICJ  Advisory Opinion regarding Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the 
Service of the United Nations, it inter alia answered the question whether the UN had the 
"capacity to bring international claim" against a State that was allegedly responsible for 
damages which the UN had suffered. To answer this question, the ICJ considered, 
initiatively, the characteristics of the UN and investigated whether they included the right to 
present international claims. Then, the ICJ determined if the UN possessed international legal 
personality. It stated that holding international legal personality meant that an entity must be 
capable of availing itself of obligations incumbent upon its members. Then, the court 
concluded that the UN was an international legal person and consequently a subject of 
international law and capable of bearing international rights and duties. Thus, it should 
possess international legal personality to carry out the intentions of its founders – the Member 
States. Additionally, the sum of its international rights comprised the right of bringing 
international claims to preserve its rights.
78
      
     All in all, what can be inferred from the above mentioned ICJ Advisory Opinion, as 
Akande points out, is that it is the members of the international organization who ascribe 
characteristics which are necessary to satisfy the criteria set out by international law to 
qualify as an international organization. Once the members ascribe those characteristics 
making it capable of fulfilling the above mentioned objective criteria predetermined by 
international law, the rules of international law confer international personality on the 
organization with all its consequences.
79
 Therefore, the ICJ has taken the middle position 
between the two above-mentioned extremes.  
    However, Zwanenburg believes that the ICJ does not support the objective theory but 
rather the inductive or subjective theory. He states that members can expressly or implicitly 
give legal personality to an international organization by provisions of constitution which 
reflect members' will. Also, he mentions that the ICJ referred to the intention of the founders 
                                                           
77 Ibid. pp. 254, 257. 
78 Reparation for Injuries, op. cit. pp. 177-180.  
79 Akande, Dapo, op. cit. p. 257. 
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in several passages of its opinion
80
 and quotes the following statements of the ICJ opinion to 
support his idea: 
In the opinion of the Court, the Organization was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in 
fact exercising and enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis 
of the possession of a large measure of international personality and capacity to operate 
upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international organization, 
and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid of international 
personality. I t must be acknowledged that its Members, by entrusting certain functions to 
it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the competence 
required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged. Accordingly, the Court has 
come to the conclusion that the Organization is an international person.
81
 
    Zwanenburg notes that there are no radical differences, practically, between the effects of 
these two theories
82
 if, as Akande states, one accepts that "the characteristics which confer 
international legal personality on international organizations must necessarily be conferred on 
it by its members."
83
 Once the members of the organization confer those characteristics 
through constituent instrument or subsequent practice, international law endows international 
organization with international personality along with its all consequences.
84
 Arguably, in the 
above-mentioned Advisory Opinion, the ICJ searched to see whether the characteristics 
which are necessary for international personality had been conferred on the UN by its 
members.
85
               
1-1-2 The Consequences of Possessing International Legal Personality 
Having international legal personality, an international organization has separate rights and 
duties from those of its members. It therefore has an independent personality which can on its 
own bring a claim before international tribunals, if such tribunals have jurisdiction to deal 
with the case, for the purpose of preserving its rights through the mechanisms by which 
international disputes are settled. It also bears responsibility for the non-fulfilment of its 
obligations.
 86
 It should also be mentioned that, as Akande points out, there is an assumption 
according to which if an international organization itself is responsible for violation or non-
                                                           
80 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. pp. 65-66.   
81 Reparation for Injuries, op. cit. p. 179.   
82 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. Cit. p. 66. 
83 Akande, Dapo. Op. cit. p. 257. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Ibid. pp. 257-258. 
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observance of its obligations, its members are not liable in regard to the organization’s 
obligations. However, this is merely a presumption and can be displaced.
87
   
    Moreover, the creation of new international obligations and rights is the other consequence 
of possessing international legal personality. Naert holds that "an entity with international 
legal personality may, within its powers, to some extent create new international obligations 
and rights (though not necessarily new laws)".
88
 The internal manifestation thereof is 
decision-making, and treaty-making is considered as its external manifestation.
89
       
    The aforementioned consequences are those which are inherent in any international legal 
personality. But, there are some consequences which do not apply to all of them and which 
derive from the nature of the personality of an international organization like the UN. One of 
these consequences is the immunity and privileges - conferred by customary international law 
- from which the international organization can benefit to function independently and 
efficiently within a host State.
90
 The other one is the competence of an international 
organization to enter into certain types of treaties such as agreements with host States or 
settling claims by or against the organization.
91
 It is important to mention that an international 
organization possesses objective personality and is therefore opposable also to non- members. 




    In sum, an international organization such as the UN has a separate legal personality from 
that of its Member States, and consequently, rights and obligations which bring it 
responsibility and accountability for all acts or omissions attributable to it. 
1-1-3 Breach of International Law Obligations and the Attribution of the Conduct of Peace 
Support Operations  
As has been mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, a legal person may be held responsible 
for a breach of obligations under international law which is attributable to him. But what are 
these obligations and how they are attributable to the UN or/and States? 
                                                           
87 Ibid., p. 258  
88 Naert, Frederik, op.cit. p. 266. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Akande, Dapo. op. cit. p. 258. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. p. 259. 
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     Admittedly, there are some obligations under international law which are incumbent upon 
both international organizations and States. But, the aspects of these obligations might be 
different for States compared to those of international organizations. The question is then 
whether international organizations are subject to the rules applicable to States and if so, with 
what changes, if any. Clearly, international organizations are subjects of international law but 
they are different from States - the traditional subject of international law.
93
  
    The other important issue is attribution of conduct of PSO personnel to the UN, and/or 
TCSs. Indeed, by referring to these rules and instruments, the obligations whose breach 
invites responsibility will be recognised and also the issue of how, to what extent and to 
whom the conduct of PSOs is attributable will be inferred. In other words, these international 
instruments define a linkage between the conduct of PSO personnel and the responsibility of 
the UN/TCSs. As Shaw states, attributability (also termed imputability) has been described as 
a legal fiction which associates the actions or omissions of officials, organs, or individuals - 
with a certain connection to the State or the UN - to the State or the UN itself. This 
attributability represents the responsibility of a State or the UN for damages to the property or 
person of an alien.
94
       
    Thus, different international obligations are binding on international organizations and 
States and will be discussed in other chapters of this thesis. These typically derive from 
customary international law and treaties. Of relevance to customary law are instruments like 
UNGA and UNSC reports and resolutions, the work of the ILC, jurisprudence and advisory 
opinions of the ICJ and so forth. Emphatically, the breach of these obligations during PSOs 
invites legal consequences - international responsibility - for the actors involved in PSOs.   
    To sum up, there are two difficulties regarding the attribution of conduct to PSOs. On the 
one hand, the multiplicity of actors involved in these operations and their tangled relationship 
make this issue complicated. On the other hand, this issue is intertwined with the question of 
State responsibility as well as the responsibility of the UN as an international organization.
95




                                                           
93 Naert, Frederik, op. cit. p. 257. 
94 Shaw, Malcolm N. "International law" 6th Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 786.  
95 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. p. 51. 
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2 Peace Support Operations and the Personnel of such Forces 
Since one of the main aspects of this thesis is the responsibility for personnel of peacekeeping 
forces and the peacekeeping operation itself, rendering a definition and description of PSOs 
would seem necessary. Owing to the fact that there is no unique definition of this term, 
defining it is a little bit difficult.  
    In 2000, the panel on United Nations Peace Operations, whose report is called the Brahimi 
report
96
 in reference to the chairman of that panel, pointed out that "United Nations peace 
operations entails three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking; and peace 
building".
97
 Additionally, there are different definitions given by officials of the UN, 
doctrines from different national publications regarding armed conflict, and scholars. The UN 
General Assembly made the first attempt to clarify the equivalent term to PSOs in use then by 
forming a special committee on peace operations in 1965.  The outcome of the committee, in 
1974, was the 'Draft Articles or Guidelines for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 
under the authority of the UNSC in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations'. 
Although the most recent draft of these Articles was published in 1977, they have 
unfortunately not been finalized yet.
98
 On the other hand, the term PSOs, as a newer term, is 
naturally not defined in the UNC. Zwanenburg states in this context that "the concept [of 
peace support operations, peace operations, or peacekeeping] was invented as an improvised 
and practical response to the failure of the United Nations Charter system of collective 
security"
99
 under Article 43 and, in general, to the lack of enforcement actions because of the 
major powers deadlock during the Cold War.
100
 Actually, it was a reply to the lack of 
consensus of the permanent members of the UNSC due to divisions between the Eastern and 
the Western blocks.
101  
    Before going further, it should also be pointed out that PSOs have been developed over 
three generations. These generations will show how the concept of PSOs have been 
transformed as time goes by.  
                                                           
96 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 21 August 2000 (Report of the Panel hereinafter). UN 
Doc.A/55/305, S/2000/809. 
97  Ibid. para.IO. 
98  Zwanenburg, Marten, op.cit. p. 11. 
99  Ibid. 
100 Frostad, Magne, "Good Guys Wearing Cuffs- The Detention of Peacekeepers" in German Yearbook of International Law, 
vol. 45, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 2002, 291-330, p.292. 
101 Gray, Christine, "The Use of Force and The International Legal Order" in Malcolm D.Evans (ed.) "International Law" 3rd  
Edition, Oxford University Press, 2010,  615-650, p.638.  
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     In 1947, pursuant to the adoption of a partition plan for Palestine by the UNGA and the 
claim of Jewish leaders to establish the state of Israel, fighting between the parties in question 
escalated. The UNSC called for a cease-fire accepted by the parties. Because of the Cold 
War, the United States and the Soviet Union were reluctant to let any further parties 
intervene. Therefore, in 1948, the UNSC established a neutral third party, composed of 
unarmed military observers and called United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation 
(UNTSO), to supervise the observance of the cease-fire.
102
 This is the example of observer 
mission which consists of unarmed military and civilian personnel who monitor the 
implementation of cease-fire agreements. Otherwise, PSOs forces are typically light armed 
and include fully equipped infantry contingents.
103
      
    However, in 1960, a rather untypical peace operation from the earlier ones of the UN took 
place within the Congo, Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) - in English the 
'United Nations Operations in the Congo'. It was established by the UNSC and its mandate 
expanded to the use of armed force beyond self-defence. The mandate authorized the 
Secretary-General to cooperate with the government and provide the government with 
necessary military forces in order to remove all the Belgian forces from the Republic of the 
Congo and to prevent the occurrence of civil war.
104
 The very important point which 
differentiates this generation from the second one is that the UNSC never made any express 
reference to Chapter VII in authorising armed force to prevent civil war and to secure the 
removal of all Belgian forces from Congo, although it used the language of that Chapter.
105
 It 
thus at least foreshadowed the later second generation mission. 
     The second generation was developed after the end of the Cold War. The UNSC expanded 
its peace support operations to over forty forces, mostly dealing with intrastate conflicts. In 
1992, the UN Secretary General, in his report 'Agenda for Peace', took an optimistic and 
expansionist view regarding preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peacemaking. This is 
obvious for example in para 29 of his report: 
In conditions of crisis within a country, when the Government requests or all parties 
consent, preventive deployment could help in a number of ways to alleviate suffering and 
to limit or control violence. Humanitarian assistance, impartially provided, could be of 
critical importance; assistance in maintaining security, whether through military, police or 
civilian personnel, could save lives and develop conditions of safety in which 
                                                           
102 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. p. 12.; Also see UNSC Resolution 50 of 29 May 1948, UN Doc. S/RES/50(1948). 
103 Millennium Report, op. cit. p. 2. 
104  http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/onucM.htm. Access: 24 September 2013 at 13:35 hrs. 
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negotiations can be held; the United Nations could also help in conciliation efforts if this 
should be the wish of the parties. In certain circumstances, the United Nations may well 
need to draw upon the specialized skills and resources of various parts of the United 





    It seems that second generation PSOs consist of operations which are ambitious and 
where the use of force may go beyond self-defense. Here, military and humanitarian 
operations seek to settle Cold War conflicts and achieve national reconciliation and the re-
establishment of effectual governments. The typical examples of these operations are mostly 
Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Central America; and the 
operations envisaged serious problems of non-cooperation in Angola and Cambodia.
107
   
    The third generation has evolved from 1999 up to the present, when the distinction 
between peacekeeping operations and enforcement operations under Chapter VII has 
become even more blurred. In 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK)
108
 and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET)
109
 were established. These operations were different from any other missions 
undertaken by the UN before. In each place, the UN established a transitional administration 
to build peace within a territory. In other words, the UN sought to accomplish all the 
functions of a State.
110
 It appears that by conducting these missions the UN entered into the 
State without the need for consent of the former government and effectively ruled the 
territory. And when that territory was ready to govern itself, the UN in different ways 
transited the power to the new government. It would seem as if that the institution of 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration, and 
Transitional Justice may be encompassed by these missions. These issues, however, are far 
beyond the Scope of this thesis, so they will not be covered here. Nevertheless, the issue of 
R2P will be considered to the extent required for addressing how HR is binding on the UN 
through R2P.  
    Coming back to the definition of PSOs, the term has been defined in different ways by 
different scholars. Before rendering a comprehensive definition of the UN PSOs, it should 
be noted that PSOs may also be grouped into two categories: 'peacekeeping operations' and 
                                                           
106  Report of Secretary General, An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, UN Doc. 
A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992, p.8, para 29. Available at: http://www.unrol.org/files/A_47_277.pdf . 
107 Gray, Christine, op. cite. p.639. 
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21 
 
'peace enforcement operations'. Hence, UN PSOs includes these two extremes which are 
secerned by the military doctrine of many armed forces such as the United States or the 
Netherland. The former is an impartial military operation accompanied with the consent of 
the host State where force will not be used except in self-defence; such as traditional PSOs 
conducted by the UN. The latter means the use of military force or the threat of its use in 
terms of an international mandate or authorization to retain or regenerate international peace 




    As far as the UN and the ICJ are concerned, peacekeeping operations are distinguished 
from enforcement actions. In 1962, the UNGA asked the ICJ to give an advisory opinion 
regarding the interpretation of the UNC Article 17, para. 2. The issue concerned the expenses 
allocated to the peace operation in Congo. The ICJ held that 
[i]t can be said that the operations of ONUC did not include a use of armed force against a 
state which the UNSC, under Article 39, determined to have committed an act of aggression 
or to have breached the peace. The armed forces which were utilised in the Congo were not 
authorised to take military action against any state. The operation did not involve preventive 
or enforcement measures against any state under Chapter VII and therefore did not constitute 
action as that term is used in Article II.
112
  
    Whereas the ICJ here defines 'enforcement action' as 'military action' against a state under 
Chapter VII of the Charter,
113
 the question is then how military action against non-State 
entities can be categorised?  
    The UN itself appears to define 'peacekeeping operations' as operations conducted by the 
UN without reference to the Chapter VII, whereas those which refer to that Chapter are called 
'enforcement'. The aforementioned distinction is reflected in reports made by the UN. For 
example, according to the Brahimi report "where enforcement action is required, it has 
consistently been entrusted to coalitions of willing States, with the authorization of the 
UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter".
114
 Other reports show that peacekeeping 
operations are referred to as the operations which are not enforcement under Chapter VII, and 
which are based on the consent of the host state. For example, the report on the work of the 
UN for 2003 submitted by the UN Secretary-General to the UNGA, categorized the UN 
                                                           
111 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. pp. 31-32.  
112 Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 20 July 1962: I.C.J. 
Reports 1962, 51-181,p. 151. Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/49/5259.pdf.  
113 Zwanenburg, Marten, op. cit. pp. 31.  
114 Report of the Panel, op. cit. para.IO. 
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missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea, in the Democrat Republic of Congo, and in Sierra Leone 
under the heading 'peacekeeping and peacebuilding'.
115
                  
         It is also worth to point out that PSOs are different from international armed conflict in 
the sense that they are not inherently international armed conflict, but enforcement operations 
could admittedly easily become international armed conflict. Both PSOs and internationally 
acting States may establish an international armed conflict, and thereby activate International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL)
116
, but the PSOs will typically have at least more legitimacy. 
         Thus, it appears that PSOs include both operations established by the UN without 
reference to Chapter VII of the Charter and those with enforcement powers under that 
Chapter. 
   Concerning the personnel of PSOs forces, they are UN officials (both staff and official 
volunteers) and “experts performing missions,” a technical term that includes military 













                                                           
115 Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization of 28 August 2003, UN Doc. A/58/I. pp. 8-10, para. 40, 
42 and 45. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ola/media/info_from_lc/A_58_1E.pdf.    
116 "International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed 
conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods 
of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. International 
humanitarian law is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between States. International 
law is contained in agreements between States – treaties or conventions –, in customary rules, which consist of State practice 
considered by them as legally binding, and in general principles. International humanitarian law applies to armed conflicts. It 
does not regulate whether a State may actually use force; this is governed by an important, but distinct, part of international 
law set out in the United Nations Charter." ICRC, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law "What is 
International Law?" 2004, Available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf ; See also Bouvie, Antoine 
A. "International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict" Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D. (series editor), Peace 
operation Training Institute, Second Edition, 2012, pp. 12-13.    
117 Sweetser, C. op. cit. p. 1645; Frostad, Magne (2002), op. cit. p.293; See also Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit.  p.13. 
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Chapter 3: Responsibility of the United Nations for its Sub-organs and What It 
Authorizes 
International responsibility is influenced by the attribution of an internationally illegal 
conduct.
118
 Therefore, it is important to establish which legal instruments regulate SEA by 
the personnel of UN PSOs and to which subjects of international law they can be attributed, 
i.e. the UN or TCS. Here, it is worthwhile to note that attribution of conduct to the TCS or the 
UN is not the only way of ensuring observance of IHL or HR.119 When an HR or IHL 
obligation is infringed, even if the act is not attributable to a State or the UN, individual 
responsibility may also exist under international criminal law. However, individual criminal 
responsibility will not be covered by this thesis.
120
       
 
1 Identifying Human Rights binding on the United Nations  
It appears that the relevant field of international law for SEA committed by its PSOs 
personnel is HR. Since an international organization cannot be a party to HR treaties, only by 
identifying sources of HR obligations in general international law can such obligations be 
imposed upon the UN.
121
  As Larsen states there are three different ways in which the UN can 
be bound by HR obligations. First, the UN as a subject of international law is bound by 
international HR standards to the extent that these standards have reached international 
customary law status (external conception). Second, the UN is bound by the HR obligations 
under the UNC in order to promote HR standards (internal conception). Third, the UN is 





                                                           
118 See DARIO, op. cit. Articles 3-4.  
119 Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit. p.105. 
120 For more information in regard to criminal responsibility of PSOs personnel, see Ferstman, Carla  "Criminalizing Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers" Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, September 2013, Available on  
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR335Criminalizing%20Sexual%20Exploitation%20and%20Abuse%20by%20Peack
eepers.pdf '; O’Brien, Melanie op. cit.; Kent, Vanessa L, "Peacekeepers as Perpetrators of Abuse: Examining the UN’s plans 
to eliminate and address cases of sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations" Vol. 14(2), African Security 
Review (2005), pp. 85-92.     
121 De Schutter, Olivier "Human Rights and the Rise of International Organizations: The Logic of Sliding Scales in the Law 
of International Responsibility" in Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, and Schmitt Pierre, (eds.), Oxford: intersentia, 
2010, 51-128, p. 56.   
122 The hybrid conception means that whenever a HR obligation is binding on Member States, it is binding on the UN as 
well.  However, because the UN cannot become a party to the conventions or treaties such as ECHR and ICCPR - when such 
obligation emanate from a treaty - it cannot be held responsible under the treaty's mechanisms for establishing responsibility. 
But, it does not mean the UN's responsibility is totally excluded. It means the obligations of Member States may influence 
the obligations of the UN and vice versa [on the basis of travaux preparatoires]. Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit. p.12; for more 
readings see Naert, Frederik "Binding international Organizations to Member State Treaties or Responsibility of Member 
States for Their Own Actions in the Framework of International Organizations" in Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, 
and Schmitt Pierre, (eds.), Oxford: intersentia, 2010, 129-168.  
123 Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit. p.12. It seems that the latter encompasses the first two ways since the Member States are also 
bound by UDHR which constitutes international customary law status and the UNC imposes some HR standards to them as 
well.   
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    In the following paragraphs, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
124
 and 
the UNC will be looked at with the views of establishing whether they oblige the UN to 
comply with HR obligations. These instruments, as held by Naert, admittedly do not 
explicitly impose HR obligations on the UN itself, but on the basis of the travaux 
preparatoires
125
 it seems that the intention of founding fathers was to bind the UN and this is 
also the prevailing view in the literature.
126
    
    Admittedly, UDHR reflects, to a large extent, international HR standards. In legal doctrine, 
there is a growing consensus that most of the rights emanate from UDHR, have obtained the 
status of legally binding norms
127
 that some have achieved jus cogens
128
 Character. It is an 
established fact that contemporary PSOs play a prominent role in the protection of HR, and 
that international HR norms – which derive from UDHR - provide a normative framework for 
the conduct of involved actors, inter alia the UN.
129
 A wide range of statements and 
documents from the UN have acknowledged that HR norms constitute the normative 
framework for such conduct.
130
 The Capstone Doctrine
131
 is a good example of the above-
mentioned idea: 
International human rights law is an integral part of the normative framework for United 
Nations peacekeeping operations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which 
sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, emphasizes that human 
rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody. United 
Nations peacekeeping operations should be conducted in full respect of human rights and 
should seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates […] 
United Nations peacekeeping personnel – whether military, police or civilian should act 
in accordance with international human rights law and understand how the 
implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights. Peacekeeping personnel 
should strive to ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. They 
                                                           
124 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), 
Paris, 10 December 1948. Available at: http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Universal-declaration-of-human-
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125 The literary meaning of this French term is preparatory works. It constitutes the materials used in preparing the ultimate 
form of an agreement or statute, especially an international treaty. The materials constitute the legislative history. This is a 
secondary form of interpretation and is used to clarify the intent of the makers of the statute or treaty. 
http://definitions.uslegal.com/t/travaux-preparatoires/; For more readings see Ris, Martin "Treaty Interpretation and ICJ 
Recourse to Travaux Préparatoires: Towards a Proposed Amendment of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties" Vol. 14, Issue 1, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review (1991) 111- 136, Available 
at:  http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol14/iss1/6.  
126 Naert, Frederik, op.cit. pp. 389-390. 
127 De Schutter, Olivier, op. cit. p. 56.  
128 Article 53 1969 VCLT defines jus cogens as a peremptory norm of general international law and reads that "[…] a 
peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as 
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character"; genocide, crimes against humanity, racial discrimination, rules prohibiting in 
slavery have jus cogens status. Crawford, James "Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law" 8th edition, Oxford 
University Press, 2012,  p. 595.  





must be able to recognize human rights violations or abuse, and be prepared to respond 
appropriately within the limits of their mandate and their competence. United Nations 
peacekeeping personnel should respect human rights in their dealings with colleagues and 
with local people, both in their public and in their private lives. Where they commit 




    It appears that, according to the above-mentioned doctrine, the UN has acknowledged that 
the personnel are responsible, individually, for HR violations within the limits of their 
mandate and their competence. It seems that the individual personnel are accountable for HR 
violations criminally; and the UN, somehow, has recognized its civil responsibility
133
 as well 
by limiting the responsibility of its personnel to their competence and mandates. It does not 
mean that individuals incur responsibility directly from HR. Although, they may violate a 
right considered by HR, they naturally have onus due to violate a code of criminal law of the 
state in which the crime occurs. They therefore have indirect criminal responsibility in 
connection with HR. 
    Moreover, as discussed in chapter 2, PSOs include both peacekeeping operations and 
enforcement Operations, but the scope of the above-mentioned document - Capstone Doctrine 
- is obviously confined to peacekeeping operations. But as Larsen states, this explicit 




     Evidently, fundamental HR should be universally respected. The UN and all Member 
States are pledged to cooperate in order to promote and observe the HR standards.
135
 
According to the Article 5 of the UDHR, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment".
136
 Thus, SEA carried out by personnel of 
UN PSOs forces constitute treatment covered by the mentioned Article and do therefore 
establish responsibility for the actors involved in PSOs - the UN in particular. Notably, SEA 
of women and children can be seen as a form of modern slavery;
137
 and Article 4 of the 
UDHR indicates that "[n]o one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms".
138
 It noteworthy that the prohibition of slavery 
and the slave trade is amongst those international HR which have been recognized as having 
                                                           
132 UN Peacekeeping operations: Principles and Guidelines (Capstone Doctrine), published by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 18.1.2008, section 1.2, pp. 14-15. Available at: 
http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/library/capstone_doctrine_eng.pdf.  
133 The focus here is on non-penal consequences. 
134 Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit. p.5, footnote no. 4.  
135 UDHR, op. cit. Preamble.  
136 UDHR, op. cit. Article 5. 
137 Muntarbhorn, Vitit, op. cit. p. 5.   
138 UDHR, op. cit. Article 4. 
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the character of jus cogens.
139
 Therefore, it seems that this Article prohibits SEA of all 
people, including women and children, and obliges the UN and Member States to comply 
with it.   
    Moreover, promoting and encouraging respect for HR is referred to in different chapters of 
the UNC and the UN is naturally bound by its very own constituent instrument. The term 
'human rights' is repeated 6 times in the Charter in Articles 1, 13, 55, 62, 68, and 76.
140
 For 
example, "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"
141
, referred to in 
Article 1 of the Charter, is one of the purposes for establishing the UN. Likewise, one of the 
purposes of international economic and social cooperation under chapter IX of the UNC is to 
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"
142
. Under Article 56, the pre-
mentioned obligations are clearly imposed on both the UN itself and its Member States in 
order to fulfill this objective.
143
 Consequently, it would even follow from Article 103 of the 
UNC that any international obligations conflicting with the obligation to respect and promote 
HR should be disregarded.
144
  
    Thus, it appears that the UN has acknowledged that HR obligations are binding on it as 
“Charter law” when it carried put the operations which it authorizes itself under UNC chapter 
VI, VII or somewhere between. Therefore, it is responsible for any SEA of women and 
children of the local population committed during PSOs by its personnel.   
    Concerning customary international law, the basis for its apparently binding nature is 
rarely examined in detail in regard to international organizations and scholars who have 
widely studied this issue have come to discrepant conclusions.
145
 That customary 
international law may be binding on the UN, nevertheless, seems to be confirmed by Article 
38 of the 1986 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations (1986 VCLT-IO)
146
 which provides 
                                                           
139 Crawford, James (2012), op. cit. p. 595.  
140 In Articles 1(3), 12(b), 55(c), 62(2), 68, and 76(c), respectively, promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, 
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141 UNC, op. cit. Article 1(3). 
142 UNC, op. cit. Article 55(c). 
143 UDHR, op. cit. Article 56. 
144 UNC, op. cit. Article 103; for more readings see De Schutter, Olivier, op. cit. pp. 94-102. 
145 Naert, Frederik, op. cit. p. 393.  
146 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International 
Organizations, 21 March 1986 (not yet in force), 1-39, Available at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_2_1986.pdf; the very fact that customary international law 
may be binding on the UN might have been seen as rendering the claim that Article 38 of 1986 VCLT-IO reflects customary 
international law.      
27 
 
that "[n]othing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming 
binding upon a third State or a third organization as a customary rule of international law, 
recognized as such".
147
   
    However, there is little relevant practice to establish in customary law international 
responsibility of international organizations for HR violations. Thus, it is naturally difficult to 
identify relevant international customary rules.
148
 However, it is noticeable that conduct by 
UN PSOs personnel has been useful in the development of principles of responsibility for the 
UN.
149
 And UN practice in this field has been comprehensive and coherent enough and done 
with the essential degree of opinion juris
150
 to be considered as customary international 
law.
151
 Malcolm Shaw points out that "international organizations in fact may be instrumental 
in the creation of customary law".
152
 The ILC also stated that records of accumulative 





2 Self-made Bindings  
The UN affirms explicitly in Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets (UN 
Code of Conduct hereinafter)
154
, that its personnel has a commitment to respect local laws, 
customs and practices, to treat host country inhabitants with respect, courtesy and 
consideration, and to act with impartiality, integrity and tact.
155
  The UN binds itself to 
observe HR and not to commit SEA, especially during PSOs. An explicit statement of UN 
Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, confirms this claim. He expresses that “the United Nations 
and I personally, are profoundly committed to a zero- tolerance policy against sexual 
exploitation or abuse by our own personnel. This means zero complacency. When we receive 
credible allegations, we ensure that they are looked into fully. It means zero impunity.”
156
 
     Furthermore, the UNGA and the UNSC have issued several resolutions indicating the 
commitment of the UN to observe HR - women's and children's rights in particular. For 
                                                           
147 Ibid. p.19, Article 38. 
148 Larsen, Kjetil M. op., cit. p. 101. 
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example, UNSC resolution 1612 (2005) welcomes the efforts of UN PSOs in implementing 
the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitations and abuses in order to 
make sure that personnel are in full compliance with the UN Code of Conduct
157
. The UNSC 
also asked the Secretary-General to take all required measures to prevent misconducts, to 
keep the UNSC informed about it, and to urge TCSs to apply preventive action including pre-
employment awareness training. TCSs should also take disciplinary action to ensure the 
accountability of the personnel in cases of SEA committed by them.
158
   
    The other document in this regard which may serve as a good example is the Statement of 
Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel 
adopted at the High-level Conference on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN 
and NGO Personnel on 4 December 2006 in New York. According to this Statement, the UN 
binds itself to prevent future sexual exploitations and abuses by its personnel. It also 
reaffirms the importance of the observance of regulations binding on the UN in regard to 
SEAs and the providing of assistance to victims.
159
 It recalls that six core principles relating 
to sexual exploitation and abuse
160
 - adopted by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee 
Working Group in July 2002 - are binding on UN staff and all personnel thereof.
161
 By 
adoption of UNGA resolution 62/214, the UN has profoundly condemned all acts of SEA by 
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at: http://watchlist.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/SC-Resolution-16121.pdf.  
159 Statement of Commitment on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and Non-UN Personnel (Statement of 
Commitment hereinafter)adopted at the High-level Conference on Eliminating Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by UN and 
NGO Personnel on 4 December 2006 in New York, USA, pp.1-5, Available at: 
http://cdu.unlb.org/Portals/0/PdfFiles/PolicyDocK.pdf. 
160 The 2002 Report and Plan of Action of the IAUNSC Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in 
Humanitarian Crises established six core principles relating to sexual exploitation and abuse, to be incorporated into the 
codes of conduct and staff rules and regulations of member organizations.These principles are as follows: 1. “Sexual 
exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers constitute acts of gross misconduct and are therefore grounds for 
termination of employment. 2. Sexual activity with children (persons under the age of 18) is prohibited regardless of the age 
of majority or age of consent locally. Mistaken belief regarding the age of a child is not a defense. 3. Exchange of money, 
employment, goods, or services for sex, including sexual favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or exploitative 
behaviour is prohibited. This includes exchange of assistance that is due to beneficiaries. 4. Sexual relationships between 
humanitarian workers and beneficiaries are strongly discouraged since they are based on inherently unequal power 
dynamics. Such relationships undermine the credibility and integrity of humanitarian aid work. 5. Where a humanitarian 
worker develops concerns or suspicions regarding sexual abuse or exploitation by a fellow worker, whether in the same 
agency or not, he or she must report such concerns via established agency reporting mechanisms. 6. Humanitarian workers 
are obliged to create and maintain an environment which prevents sexual exploitation and abuse and promotes the 
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systems which maintain this environment.” See Statement of Commitment, op. cit. p. 5; Report of the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee Task Force on protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crises of 13 June 2002, Plan of 
Action, Section I.A. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/IASCTFReport.pdf.   
161 Statement of Commitment, op. cit. p.1. 
162 UNGA Resolution No. 214 on 'United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff and Related Personnel' adopted at its 62end session in March 7, 2008, UN 
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    Furthermore, the prohibition of SEA by PSOs personnel was considered in the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome resolution
163
 through which the UNGA expressed its worries about "the 
increasing number of children involved in and affected by armed conflict, as well as all other 
forms of violence, including domestic violence, sexual abuse and exploitation and 
trafficking".
164
 It also emphasized on the necessity of cooperation between all States to adopt 
policies whereby national capacities will be strengthened in order to improve the situation of 
those children and to assist in their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
165
 
    Additionally, the UNGA has adopted some resolutions on the prohibition of SEA 
regarding specific regions, in which its PSOs personnel are serving, pursuant to the reports of 
the Office of Internal Oversight Services on SEA crisis in those regions. For example, under 
the resolution on Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees by aid Workers in West 
Africa,
166
 the UNGA condemned any SEA of refugees and internally displaced persons 
particularly women and children,
167
 and emphasized that the highest standards of conduct and 
accountability are required of all personnel serving in PSOs.
168
 It also recognized the shared 
responsibility of the UN and TCSs, within their respective competence, to ensure that all 
PSOs personnel who commit SEA are held accountable,
169
 and reiterated the necessity of 
specific responsibilities of humanitarian aid workers being incorporated into codes of conduct 
in order to prevent SEA and to adopt appropriate disciplinary procedures for dealing with 
such violations when they occur.
170
 
    Among all the relevant UN resolutions and documents, the Secretary-General’s Bulletin on 
Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse
171
 (S.G. Bulletin 
hereinafter), where the zero-tolerance policy of the UN has been embodied, is the most 
prominent one. The Secretary-General reiterates the prohibition of SEA as misconduct of UN 
staff and personnel and promulgates specific standards in order to protect women and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Doc. A/RES/62/214, pp.1-2. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/214&Lang=E;   
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children as the most vulnerable part of the population. These standards iterate existing 
obligations –but are not an exhaustive list of obligations- under the UN staff regulations and 
rules.
172
 To reiterate the importance of observance of HR by UN personnel, this last citation 
from the UN staff rules would be worthwhile: "Staff members shall uphold and respect the 
principles set out in the Charter, including faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women. Consequently, 
staff members shall exhibit respect for all cultures; they shall not discriminate against any 




    As shown above, the self-binding mechanism has by definition not been imposed on the 
UN from any other entity. The self-binding obligations are voluntary and remain internal to 
the UN.
174
 According to De Schutter, self-regulation is the ideal mechanism through which 
the responsibility of international organizations such as the UN can be improved, owing to 
the fact that this voluntary adoption of certain standards by the UN allows it to choose 
sufficiently detailed standards and to adopt obligations tailored to the specific context in with 
the UN operates.
175
     
  
3 Responsibility for the United Nations under DARIO 
 The work of the ILC on responsibility of international organizations, DARIO, has not 
resulted in a binding convention, but the soft law document develops diverging rules 
regarding responsibility of international organizations for internationally wrongful acts. It is 
constructed around the fundamental principles regarding attribution of conduct to an 
international organization.
176
 The principles of this document are supported, to a large degree, 




     The most essential principle of international responsibility regarding the UN is found in 
DARIO Article 3.
178
 It states that every internationally wrongful act invites international 
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 Article 4 defines an internationally wrongful act and determines the 
characteristics of such an act of an international organization. It holds that an action or 
omission, which is attributable to that organization under international law and constitutes a 




    The very core element around which DARIO has been constituted is - as mentioned in 
preceding paragraphs - the attribution of conduct to an international organization - the UN for 
the purpose of this thesis. According to DARIO, there are two criteria of attribution of a 
conduct to the UN. First, the conduct of an organ or agent of the UN is attributable to the UN 
if it performs its official functions, whatever position they hold
181
 even if the officials of that 
organ or agent exceed the authority of the organ or agent or contravene instruction. As long 
as they act in an official capacity and within the overall function of the UN, their conducts are 
attributable to the UN
182
. Second and the most important criterion for the purpose of this 
thesis would be where the UN holds effective control and command (ECC)
183
 over the 
conduct of other entities.
184
 According to the former the act of all subsidiary organs of the 
UN is attributable to it. And as regards the latter, if the UN has ECC over PSOs forces, it will 
incur responsibility for such personnel. 
    Here, a matter of crucial importance is which paradigm PSOs do fall into. That is, whether 
the conduct of UN PSOs personnel's is attributable to the UN under Article 6 or under Article 
7.   
    Before moving to the next section, it is worth noting that, regarding attribution of conduct, 
one may argue whether the general principle of attribution of conduct in international law are 
applicable to the assessment of international responsibility under HR. In other words, if there 
is a lex specialis
185
 rule in HR which contains principles incompatible with general 
                                                           
179 DARIO, op. cit. Article 3. 
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182 Ibid.  Article 8.   
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uncertainty also features in jurisprudence and literature on attribution of conduct to international organizations. Burke, 
Roisin, "Attribution of Responsibility: Sexual Abuse and Exploitation, and Effective Control of Blue Helmets" Vol. 16, 
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international responsibility. These Articles present the same rule and provide that Draft Articles "do not apply where and to 
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international law regarding international responsibility, it may be assumed to constitute a 
self-contained regime and prevail over general international law including DARIO and 
DARS.
186




3-1 Subsidiary Organ 
As has already been discussed a bit in this thesis, the conduct of a subsidiary organ of the UN 
is attributable to it in accordance with Article 6 of DARIO. The question arises here whether 
UN PSOs function as a subsidiary organ of the UN? Since there is no permanent legal 
framework in this regard, it must be investigated case by case.
188
 However, as a main rule 
developed over time, PSOs are integrated into the UN as subsidiary organ of the UN.
189
 This 
is stated in several international instruments and documents. For example, according to the 
UNC the UNSC may establish subsidiary organs in order for it to perform its functions.
190
 
PSO could be one of these subsidiary organs tasked by the UNSC with maintenance of 
international peace and security.   
    It is also explicitly provided in the Model SOFA that "[t]he United Nations peace-keeping 
operation, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the status, privileges and 
immunities of the United Nations".
191
 Likewise, the UN legal counsel, in 2004, expressed that 
the conduct of PSOs, as a subsidiary organ of the UN, is imputable to the UN and thus the 
UN is responsible for compensation.
192
 But it was the very assumption that the UN had 
exclusive control over the deployment of the national contingents of a peacekeeping force 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation the 
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of  International Relations, pp. 361-362;  B. Simma and Pulkowski,"Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in 
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A/59/10, pp. 288-289, para. 315.  
188 Larsen, Kjetil M. op. cit. p. 112. 
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190 Article 29 of UNC reads: "The UNSC may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of 
its functions". 
191 UNGA, Model Status of Forces Agreement for Peace-keeping Operations (Model SOFA hereinafter), Report of the 
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which led the UN legal counsel to state so.
193
 Therefore, as iterated in preceding paragraphs, 
it appears that the status of a subsidiary organ for PSOs should be considered in combination 
with the other main attribution establishing way: ECC. In other words, it would seem that the 
status of PSOs as subsidiary organs of the UN is not enough for attributing their conduct to 
the UN unless the UN exercises ECC over PSOs.
194
  
    As is pointed out in the statements of the UN Secretariat, PSOs under ECC of the UN are 
given the status of subsidiary organs.
195
 Therefore, the attribution of conduct to the UN is 
premised on the assumption that PSOs are given the status of subsidiary organs in 
conjunction with ECC by the UN. It appears that, however, ECC is the decisive factor which 
should be studied further. 
 3-2 Effective Control and Command  
The command and control structure and its legal framework in the context of UN PSOs 
developed on an ad hoc basis in the sense that there is difference between what is provided in 
law (de jure) and what is going on in fact (de facto). As Burke argues there are substantial 




    Concerning the de jure aspect, Article 43 of the UNC provides that "[a]ll Members of the 
United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
undertake to make available to the UNSC, on its call and in accordance with a special 
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, 
necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security".
197
 Furthermore, 
according to Articles 46 and 47 (1) a Military Staff Committee (MSC) shall be established 
and tasked with advising and assisting the UNSC on all issues related to military aspects of 
the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of 
                                                           
193 The United Nations assumes that in principle it has exclusive control of the deployment of national contingents in a 
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command and control, and thus has the legal status of a United Nations subsidiary organ. In authorized chapter VII 
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operation conducted under national or regional command and control, international responsibility lies where effective 
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196 Burke, Roisin, op. cit. pp. 4-5.   





 Article 47(3) shows that the MSC is responsible for providing the UNSC with 
strategic direction of PSOs.
199
  
    Houck holds that strategic direction - in Article 47 (3) - is a process of command in which 
the MSC functions as a linkage in the chain of commands between the UNSC and operational 
commanders.
200
 The MSC, after considering the views of operational commanders, provide 
the UNSC with military advises. And, consequently, when the UNSC makes decisions, the 
MSC would translate UNSC political objectives into a military plan, which would be 
transmitted to operational commanders in the field.
201
 Article 47 (3) also provides that future 
questions relating to command issues shall be resolved subsequently.
202
 Houck believes that 
the Article provided so, "not because the drafters were unable to agree on the meaning of 
"command", but because they were unable to agree on a mechanism for selecting 
commanders"
203
 . Burke however notes that the drafters were unable to do that simply 
because there was no agreement among them upon the meaning of 'command'.
204
  
    The above-mentioned Articles and an overview of Chapter VII of the Charter show that the 
UN drafters contemplated a centralized control system over UN PSOs. However, due to Cold 
War tensions the system desired by the drafters of the Charter was never been established.
205
 
Therefore, concerning the de facto aspect, PSOs and its command and control structure 
developed over time on an ad hoc basis and has been different from operation to operation - 
as was discussed in the first chapter of this thesis regarding different generations of PSOs, 
especially the difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.  
    In principle, there is a clear connection between exercising ECC and the attribution of 
conduct. Many international documents and relevant sources suggest that the conduct of 
PSOs is attributable to the entity who exercises ECC over PSOs. For example, the Secretary-
General in his report to the 51
st
 session of UNGA  states that "[t]he international 
responsibility of the United Nations for combat-related activities of United Nations forces is 
premised on the assumption that the operation in question is under the exclusive command 
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and control of the United Nations".
206
 He continues that if there is an agreement between the 
UN and the TCS regarding the modalities of cooperation in joint operations, international 
responsibility lies where ECC is vested. Otherwise, responsibility would be determined in 
each and every case in accordance with the degree of ECC by either party in the conduct of 
the operation.
207
 According to Larsen, legal literature provides strong support for using ECC 
as the most important criterion for determining international responsibility. Many scholars 
such as Seyersted, Amrallah, Peck, Shrege, Krieger and others support the pre-mentioned 
idea and believe, unanimously, that when PSO forces are under the ECC of the UN, the 
responsibility is vested in the UN. 
208
 
    However, the degrees and levels of ECC are still complex because UN PSOs operate on 
several levels, political and military, national and international.
209
 The difficulty is that TCSs 
simply do not abstain fully or partially from commanding their troops;
210
 although PSOs are 
subsidiary organs of the UN, troops still remain organs or employees of their respective 
States.
211
 As stated in the Model SOFA, military contingents, while deployed UN PSOs are 
subject to the disciplinary and criminal jurisdiction of their respective TCSs.
212
          
    As a preliminary conclusion, Article 7 DARIO suggests that which entity in the particular 
circumstances will have the conduct attributed, is more important than whether the conduct is 
attributable solely to the TCS or the UN.
213
 Therefore, it is of importance to investigate if 
there was real effective control over the PSOs during operations. Burke observes that "what is 
really at issue in determining effective control is who had the ability to act to prevent 
misconduct or to punish the perpetrator".
214
 Evidently, it should be considered in a case by 
case manner and there is no resolute formula to apply to all circumstances.  
    Article 7 in conjunction with Article 48(1) DARIO – which suggests the possibility that 
international organization and one or more States can be simultaneously responsible for the 
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same internationally wrongful acts -
215
 allows dual attribution of conduct 
216
 - to both TCSs 
and the UN - which would give victims of SEAs a more effective route for redress.
217
 
Concerning dual attribution, ILC leaves in its commentaries on DARIO open the possibility 
of conduct being attributable to both the international organization and the State, and 
provides that  
 
          "[a]lthough it may not frequently occur in practice, dual or even multiple attribution of 
conduct cannot be excluded. Thus, attribution of a certain conduct to an international 
organization does not imply that the same conduct cannot be attributed to a State; nor 
does attribution of conduct to a State rule out attribution of the same conduct to an 
international organization. One could also envisage conduct being simultaneously 
attributed to two or more international organizations, for instance when they establish a 
joint organ and act through that organ".
218
    
   
    Notably, dual attribution of conduct and consequently dual/joint/shared responsibility has 
been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Netherlands in Nuhanovic case
219
. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the strong approach to dual attribution of conduct taken by the Court of 
Appeal and consequently dissolved the appeal. It found that there is a possibility that both the 
Netherlands and the UN had effective control over the same internationally wrongful conduct 
committed by Dutchbat troops, and thus that the UN did not have exclusive responsibility. 
220
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Chapter 4:  Responsibility to Protect as an Obligation on both the Member States and 
the United Nations 
The opening words of the UNC contain a collective will to gain equal rights, justice, and 
development.
221
 As mentioned explicitly, the catastrophic experiences of World War II 
motivated the international community to save succeeding generations from the scourge of 
war. 
    The UNSC has a large and systematic impact on global security. One of the tools to which 
the UNSC resorts in order to fulfil its main duty – maintaining international peace and 
security
222
 - is a legal concept called R2P. Also, R2P plays an important role in global 
governance as applied by the UNSC. 
    According to Hobbes’ way of thinking, as Nagel points out, the government has the 
exclusive right to use force and violence. This right legitimizes violent acts of States to 
uphold order and security. The very concept of the sovereign State has been the main obstacle 
for HR developments for a long time. Owing to the fact that HR and equal rights standards 
should be applied both domestically and globally, and HR issues and justice are not merely 
domestic issues, the whole of global society is to some extent responsible for HR violations. 
To achieve such global justice, global governance must be applied by international organs. 
Thus, keeping world peace and security is a collective responsibility.
223
 As Thomas Nagel 
further points out, "the idea of global justice without a world government is a chimera".
224
 
Although the UNSC is not a world government, it is one of the organs which help achieve 
global governance through the use of its powers, including R2P.  
    This new concept in international law, world politics and international relations can work 
as a double-edged sword. That is, R2P can be an opportunity for basing the world on the 
foundation of human dreams concerning peace and freedom. In contrast, it can also provide a 
context for illegal interference, including international use of force. It follows that misuse of 
this concept may lead to a new form of colonialism. Without clear instructions for which 
measures may be used against HR violations, the rules can be interpreted based on the 
interests of the great powers. However, global governance as applied by the UNSC through 
R2P and its challenges are far beyond the scope of this thesis. The issue we are concerned 
                                                           
221 UNC, op. cit. Preamble. 
222 Ibid., Article 24 (1).  
223 Nagel, Thomas "The Problem of Global Justice" Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, No. 2, (2005) pp. 114-115 & 125-127.  
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with here is merely the concept and principles of R2P which reveal HR obligations binding 
on the UN as well as its Member States. Furthermore, the procedure of the UNSC regarding 
R2P shows how the UNSC applies it through PSOs and these operations are granted 
enhanced legitimacy through R2P. 
1 Responsibility to Protect: History, Concept, and Principles 
1-1 History and Concept 
R2P has roots in the endeavour of the international community to avoid repeating the painful 
memories of the World Wars. The Charter of the United Nations established the first 
proper
225
 collective decision making body for the protection of world peace and security. 
According to the Charter, all nations are supposed to abstain from violence in their relations 
and maintain international peace and security as a collective goal.
226
 
    In recent years most of the armed conflicts have taken place within States, not between 
them. These conflicts include those initiated by liberation movements, armed struggle against 
the central government in general, and rival armed parties fighting for power. This may lead 
to ethnic cleansing, genocide, and other forms of violence. Regardless of the name and the 
purpose of these lethal conflicts, their results are the same: HR violations, displacement, and 
widespread violence against civilians especially children and women, poverty, famine, and 
sympathy for terrorist groups.
227
 In extreme cases even failed States. 
    During the last decades of the twentieth century the world was faced with a dramatic 
upsurge in domestic armed conflicts and HR violations within States. The genocides in 
Cambodia, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina sounded the alarm for the international 
community to revise their methods in fighting the manifold HR violations. 
    Since the end of the Second World War, the international community and the UN, as the 
expression of the collective will of nation-States on global issues, have attempted to protect 
civilians in armed conflict. The unforgettable experience of the Holocaust caused States to 
                                                           
225 The League of Nation was the first attempt of international community to protect world peace and security. The League 
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establish a legal framework against this kind of disaster. These efforts lead in 1948 to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
228
 Moreover, "near 
the end of the 1990s there was a recognized need to shift the debate about crisis prevention 
and response: The security of community and the individual, not only the State, must be 
priorities for national and international policies".
229
 
    To respond to the civil wars, internal armed conflicts, and HR violations within States, 
Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General at that time, drew the State member’s attention to the 
concept of sovereignty and the issue of humanitarian intervention.
230
 Annan's main question 
was "when [must] the international community… intervene for humanitarian purposes?"
231
 
    Based on this proposal, the Canadian Foreign Minister L1oyd Axworthy established the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The term R2P was first 
presented in the report of this commission in December 2001. Building on Francis Deng's 
idea of sovereignty as responsibility, the commission addressed Annan's question.
232
 This 
report and its later versions have shaped the principles of R2P. 
1-2 Principles 
The concept of a sovereign State, rooted in Hobbes’ thoughts, is a genuine obstacle to real 
improvement in HR although the respect for HR has improved in many States. Hence, a 
reassessment of the definition of sovereignty seems to be necessary. 
    The norm of non-intervention in internal affairs, which is codified in the UNC Art. 2 (7) as 
regards the UN itself, is one side of the principle of sovereignty. But we now see a re-
characterization "from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in both internal 
functions and external duties".
233
 
    This new understanding of sovereignty combined with a redefinition of human security as 
"the security of the people - their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, 
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respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights 
and fundamental freedoms",
234
 are the theoretical basis of the R2P. 
    Therefore, the pillars of R2P are transformations of accepted traditional concepts. R2P is 
thus founded upon three non-sequential pillars: 
"1. The State carries the primary responsibility for the protection of populations from 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
2. The international community has a responsibility to assist States in fulfilling this 
responsibility. 
3. The international community should use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State fails to protect its 
populations or is in fact the perpetrator of crimes, the international community must be 




    These pillars appear to show that R2P is not a pretext for intervention in other sovereign 
States or a unilateral right to authorize military attacks. It is rather to be understood as 
international solidarity in order to prevent, react and rebuild. These three elements, the 
responsibility to prevent, react, and rebuild, were approved in 2005 by the UN, and are the 
very foundation of R2P. The process of implementing these elements consists of political, 
economic, legal, and military measures.
236
 
2 The Inner Workings and Procedure of the Security Council regarding Responsibility 
to Protect 
To be familiar with the central issues regarding R2P,
237
 it is important to point out a few 
details about the UNSC itself. According to Article 7 of the UNC, the UNSC is one of six 
principal organs of the UN.
238
 Its main function is the maintenance of international peace and 
security around the world.
239
 In order for the UNSC to be capable of accomplishing its 
responsibility, all members of the UN confer authority on the UNSC to act on behalf of 
them,
240
 and according to Charter Article 25, "[t]he Members of the United Nations agrees to 
                                                           
234  Ibid. 
235  http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/about-rtop, op. cit. 
236 World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, op. cit. pp. 3-4.  
237 In order to assess how HR is binding on the UN through R2P, it is necessary to study how R2P works through inner 
procedure of the UN.  
238 UNC, op. cit. Article. 7.  
239 Ibid. Articles 23 (1) & 24 (1). 
240 Ibid. Article 24 (1). 
41 
 
accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC in accordance with the present Charter".
241
  
The decisions made by the UNSC under Chapter VII are binding on all members; but the 
UNSC may also choose to only give recommendations. The UNSC has 15 members - 5 
permanent and 10 non-permanent - and decisions are made by a majority of 9 out of 15 but 
each of the permanent members has veto powers.
242
 Drawing on the defined role of the 
UNSC in keeping and maintaining international peace and security, it could be said that the 
UNSC is the main international actor with the power to authoritatively protect HR. 
    According to Chapter VI and VII of the UNC, the UNSC has two main tools to maintain 
international peace and security. In consideration of Chapter VI of the Charter, the UNSC has 
the power to request pacific settlement of disputes through discussion, inquiry, mediation, 
and conciliation.
243
 As Article 33 and 34 of the Charter spell out, the UNSC can investigate 
any dispute which is likely to jeopardize international peace and security, and invite the 
parties to such disputes to settle it through the aforementioned peaceful means.  It can also 
recommend parties such terms of settlement in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter.
244
  
    Peaceful operations are divided into three categories, namely conflict prevention and 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building.
245
 Peacemaking activities try to stop the 
conflict in progress by diplomacy or mediation. Peacekeeping - as a subclass of PSOs as 
explained in the first chapter of this thesis - addresses typically civil wars and attempts to 
build peace in the hazardous aftermath of civil wars. Peace-building is a series of measures 
conducted on the far side of conflict to rebuild the foundations of peace. Peace-building 
measures encompasses, but are not limited to, demobilisation, the reintegration of former 
combatants into civilian society, enhancing respect towards HR, training police forces, 
reforming the judicial system and so forth. As mentioned in preceding paragraphs, these 




    By virtue of Chapter VII of the Charter, the UNSC has also the power to apply economic 
and political sanctions,
247
 or to conduct military enforcement
248
 - as the other subclass of 
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PSOs - to preserve collective security. Accordingly, if there is a threat to the peace, breach of 
the peace or an act of aggression, the UNSC may authorize the use of force against the 
delinquent State.
249
 The enforcement operations are the most important feature of the 




    As long as humanitarian protection purposes are of concern to the UN and listed amongst 
the purposes for the UN in Article 1 of the Charter, the UNSC functions on behalf of Member 
States and may develop the humanitarian imperative through R2P. Hence, the public 
acceptance of a shared R2P has become commonplace.
251
 Thus, there is reasonable 
agreement on the fact that people who end up in dangerous conflict situations should be 
protected from serious crimes.
252
 States are therefore responsible to protect their people from 
serious crimes, namely genocide, ethnic cleansing, crime against humanity, and war crimes. 
International society has a duty to help the states in accomplishing their responsibility to 
protect their people from HR violation and such crimes. If a State should nevertheless fail to 
fulfil its responsibility, international society, which confers authority on the UNSC to act on 
its behalf, should take decisive and reasonable action through the provisions set out in the 
Chapter VII of the UNC. It is worthwhile to point out that R2P has been reaffirmed in several 









 R2P now is one of the primary functions of the UNSC which may act through 
PSOs, and it is very central to the legitimacy of these operations.
257
 
    The pillar structure of R2P - is more easily understandable than its legal status. R2P, as 
Zifcak believes, has been principally a political doctrine rather than legal one.
258
 Although 
R2P is considered an obligation, the question is what kind of obligation? Is it a hard and fast 
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legal obligation whose infringement invites legal responsibility for UNSC or it is soft law 
which is not binding on the UN? Or does it provide the UNSC with a new authority it did not 
have before? In other words, what is the legal status of R2P? To answer this question, a look 
at the 2005 World Summit Outcome would seem necessary. 
    According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, States strictly committed themselves to 
protect their population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. It states that "[w]e accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it".
259
 
It appears that the responsibility of States is expressed in a rather strong language and might 
therefore be considered a rigid obligation.  In contrast, responsibility of the UN or in the 
words of the abovementioned document: Responsibility of the "international community, 
through the United Nations",
260
 to help protect populations from the above-mentioned crimes, 
is less strict. Regarding coercive measures under Chapters VII, the outcome document 
indicates that "we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the UNSC".
261
 It appears that States are reluctant to recognise that the UNSC and its 
Member States bear legal obligations for the protection of population against grave HR 
violations.
262
 As Peters points out, this weak phrase was inserted during the drafting history 
to replace stronger obligations.
263
  
    Nevertheless, it would seem that, despite a weak language, it is still an obligation. In this 
regard, Peters believes that the responsibility of the UN under Chapter VII to take coercive 
measures to protect population from grave HR violation, pull "pre-existing norms [and 
principles] together and places them in a novel framework",
264
 and strengthens the normative 
power of those principles.
265
 It might also be seen as a powerful political call for all States to 




    However, the 2005 World Summit Outcome is not itself a legally binding instrument since 
it is merely a UNGA resolution. But as some scholars believe, since the UNGA is extremely 
representative of the world's nations, the political debates towards this document and the text 
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itself manifest an opinio juris which together with relevant practice may consequently lead to 
the formation of customary international law.
267
 Additionally, as held by Peters, the other 
important factor which constructs opinio juris in regard to R2P, is the practice of the UNSC 
in its binding resolutions regarding R2P, resolutions 1973 (2011) and 1975 (2011)
268
 in 
particular, since these resolutions as such are binding and express an opinio juris.
269
 Finally, 
UN practice in relation to PSOs for the protection of civilians in armed conflicts might also 
be relevant international practice contributing to the creation of an international customary 
obligation to protect civilians from grave HR violation. Thus, it might be that R2P is an 




    All in all, R2P is on its way to become a customary norm.
271
 But what is its content? Under 
UNC Article 39, the UNSC "shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security"
272
. It seems that the UNSC is the foremost entity authorized to decide if 
there is a threat to international peace and security, and it does not need to give reasons for its 
decisions. When it comes to the veto right of the permanent members of the UNSC, R2P 
nevertheless does not oblige the UNSC to use its Chapter VII powers since stronger State 
practice would be necessary to revoke this significant part of the UN system. Perhaps it may 
lower the threshold for UNC Art. 39, but this is currently mere speculation. At the very least, 
R2P has not established a unilateral right to use force on foreign territory.   
    So, it may be assumed that R2P even as a fledgling rule of customary international law 
cannot bind HR to the UN itself. Therefore, it may be true that R2P is more of a moral 
obligation than a legal one. And the dangers which emanate from an abuse of this imperative 
moral behaviour, may make the UNSC act through R2P in order to restore or maintain 
international peace and security.
273
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    As regards the UNSC, there is not sufficient UNSC or State practice to say that there is an 
obligation to respond to these crises etc. But, perhaps there might be a case for R2P 
highlighting and adding somewhat to HR obligations as regards how the UNSC uses its 
authority, especially its power to derogate from other international law obligations under 
UNC Art. 103. It is not obligation to go in but if there is HR violation, it is a moral obligation 
not to allow them to be violated. 
    As regards TCSs, it might be hard to say that R2P identifies additional HR obligations for 
these States than they had before under treaties or customary international law. Perhaps R2P 
merely gives some added moral dimensions to these rights.       
    Whatever the nature of R2P, it at least highlights established HR obligation binding on 
Member States, and might be in the process of establishing some added obligations for the 
UNSC itself.  Finally, R2P and PSOs interact as the UNSC applied R2P through PSOs and 
PSOs seem to be legitimized through R2P.  
    Due to the fact that "[t]he obligations of international organizations may influence the 
obligations of states and vice versa",
274
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Chapter 5: Responsibility of Troop Contributing States for Sexual Exploitation and 
Abuses  
It may seem that States are merely responsible for internationally wrongful acts or omissions 
which impose damages on another State; in the sense that one State is plaintiff against the 
other State and must be compensated by the trespasser State. But States can be held 
responsible for redressing individuals as well. In the case of SEA committed by UN PSOs 
personnel, TCSs may be held responsible for the misconduct of their troops in order to 
redress the victims of such wrongdoings. It is worthwhile pointing out that no difficulty arises 
in regard to the international legal personality of TCSs – which is a requirement of 
establishing international responsibility - on the basis that States "by definition have an 
international legal personality, possession of this being a necessary evidence of statehood".
275
 
    Admittedly, a State as an abstract legal entity cannot, in reality, act by itself; but it can do 
so through its servants – authorized representatives and officials. And if the conducts of its 
authorized servants and organs are attributable/imputable to it, that State may be held 
accountable for the said conduct.
276
 As discussed in chapter 2, attributability is an important 
concept in the context of international responsibility.
277
 It therefore becomes necessary to 
examine whether the conduct of PSO personnel regarding SEA may be attributable to a TCS.                     
    Two theories exist here regarding State responsibility, namely the objective/risk theory and 
the subjective/fault theory.
278
 According to the former, liability of a State is strict; in the 
sense that once an unlawful act – attributable to a State – is committed by an agent of that 
State and especially when it causes damages on the territory of another State, the first-
mentioned State is internationally responsible irrespective of good or bad faith. The latter 
approach holds intentional or negligent conduct on the part of the agent concerned as a 
necessary element in order to establish international responsibility of a State.
279
 However, 
these theories will not be considered further due to the space and scope limitations of this 
thesis.
280
 Instead, the issue of HR binding on TCSs and the responsibility under DARS will 
be discussed in the following parts.    
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1 Identifying Human Rights binding on Troop Contributing States  
States are the primary holders of obligations under HR, as the legal regime as such was 
primarily established and developed for the protection of individuals against abuses 
undertaken by States.
281
 TCSs are bound by HR obligations regarding SEA, as is also the UN. 
However, the international sources of law under which they are bound differ from those of 
the UN since TCSs can be parties to HR treaties while the UN cannot. Actually, the UDHR 
and the UNC are the only common instruments which impose HR obligations on both the UN 
and TCSs.  
    As was discussed in chapter 3, Articles 5 and 4 of the UDHR contain provisions regarding 
the prohibition of torture, inhuman treatment, and modern slavery. Admittedly, SEAs are 
obvious examples of these forbidden behaviors.  
    Moreover, a TCS may also be party to HR conventions. Some of these conventions may 
even explicitly prohibit SEA against women and children. Thus, non-observance of such 
conventions may incur international responsibility for any TCS which is a contracting State. 
It should be noted that Article 29 1969 VCLT provides that treaties are binding upon each 
State Party in respect of its entire territory, unless a different intention appears from the treaty 
or is otherwise established.
282
 However, the real question is perhaps whether these obligations 
also applied abroad and if the responsibility of the States can be replaced by the responsibility 
of international organization like the UN.   
    The Convention on the rights of the Child (CRC)
283
 prohibits SEAs in all forms. Article 19 
of the CRC ensures a child the right to protection from all forms of violence and reads as 
follows: "States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and 
educational measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence, 
injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual 
abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of 
the child".
284
 Notably, according to the Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General 
Comment on the Article 19
285
 , communities and camps or settlements for refugees and 
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people displaced by conflict and/or natural disasters are a type of setting in which the child's 
protection and well-being must be secured.
286
 On the other hand, Article 19 is not limited to 
violence perpetrated solely by caregivers in a personal context, but encompasses situations in 
which State actors misuse their power over children.
287
Furthermore, State actors are included 
in the group in whose care children are.
288
  
    Thus, TCS troops on UN PSO duty are responsible for protecting and caring for the whole 
population including children, and if misconduct is attributable to a TCS, international 
responsibility may arise for the relevant TCS. According to Article 34 of the CRC – which is 
the most important Article in the CRC in regard to SEAs -  all State parties are obliged to 
protect children from all forms of SEAs including unlawful, coercive and inducible sexual 
activities and practices, pornographic performances, and prostitution.
289 Furthermore, Article 
35 whose scope is broader than Article 34, guarantees the prevention of abduction, sale and 
trafficking of the child.
290
 When it forbids any forms of trafficking, sale, and abduction, it can 
be construed that it also includes the prevention of trafficking, sale, and abduction for the 
purpose of SEA.  
    Under Articles 37 (a) and 38 (1 and 4) of the CRC, State parties are obliged to ensure 
proper treatment and avoid torture and cruel treatment, and undertake to protect the whole 
population affected by armed conflicts, especially children, and comply with IHL.
291
 It may 
be true that the pre-mentioned Articles implicitly preclude State parties from SEAs as such 
would be in contrast to proper treatment and protection of children in armed conflicts. The 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography (OP1 hereinafter)
292
 prohibits the sale of children, child prostitution, and child 
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 and obliges each State Party to ensure that SEA against children in all forms 
are fully covered by its criminal or penal law, whether it is committed domestically or 
transnationally or on an individual or organized basis.
294
    
    The CRC also includes provisions regarding rehabilitation of child victims and provides 
that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological 
recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or 
abuse; torture or any other form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or 
armed conflicts. Such recovery and reintegration shall take place in an environment which 
fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child".
295
 A similar provision regarding 
rehabilitation and social reintegration of child victims is also included in Optional Protocol to 
the CRC on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts (OP2 hereinafter)296.297 
     Overall, as observed by Muntarbhorn, interdisciplinary measures including law and 
politics should be taken against SEA directed at children, and such measures should be taken 
through education, socialization, and mobilization. By doing so, Article 34 of CRC must be 
implemented on different levels; national, bilateral, and multilateral. The latter would 
seemingly include both regional and international cooperation.
298
  
    Under Article 2 of the CRC, the general implementation obligation is set out. It provides 
that "States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to 
each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind […]".
299
 States need to 
be able to show that they have implemented the provisions set forth in the CRC to the 
maximum extent of their available resources and, where necessary, having sought 
international cooperation.
300
 The question which may arise is whether the CRC applies 
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extraterritorially. According to Gondek, there are two main bases for extraterritorial 
application of HR treaty obligations, namely, the existence of control and the concept of 
international assistance and cooperation.
301
 The provisions of CRC may therefore also apply 
outside the territory of a State Party through its troops, and since a TCS exercises a level of 
effective control over its troops during PSOs, its jurisdiction is not replaced by that of the 
UN. 
    A convention regarding women's rights known as the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
302
 It explicitly prohibits making 
women the subject of SEAs. Here, Article 3 ensures the exercise and enjoyment of 
fundamental HR and freedoms for women.
303
 Moreover, Article 6 concerns SEA and 
provides that "States Parties shall take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to 
suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of prostitution of women".
304
 In 1989, 
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW Committee 
hereinafter) adopted its General Recommendation on Violence against Women calling on all 
parties to protect women and girls, as a vulnerable part of society, from violence including 
sexual violence and sexual harassment.
305
 
    Regarding the issue of jurisdiction implied in Article 2 of CEDAW, it seems that States 
primarily exercise territorial jurisdiction through legislation to abolish all forms of 
discrimination against women in accordance with the convention.
306
 However, according to 
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the General recommendation No. 28
307
 provided by the CEDAW Committee, States parties 
shall apply the obligations which derive from the convention without any discrimination both 
to citizens and non-citizens, including refugees, asylum-seekers, migrant workers and 
stateless persons, within their territory or under their effective control, regardless of whether 
the affected persons are in their territory.
308
 Additionally, the CEDAW Committee reiterates 
in General Recommendation No. 30
309
 the necessity of extraterritorial application of the 
Convention to persons within their effective control and expresses that in conflict or post-
conflict situations, State parties are bound by CEDAW obligations wherever they exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign territory, for example, through their national contingents and 
forces that form part of UN PSOs.
310
 Thus, as TCSs exercise their jurisdiction over a foreign 
territory through their effective control over their PSO troops, they are extraterritorially 
bound by CEDAW obligations and are responsible for SEAs committed by their troops in 
such situations.       
    The ICCPR is another convention which establishes HR obligations for TCSs regarding 
SEAs and which reinforces the necessity of protecting the rights of children and women. 
Article 8 of ICCPR repeats the call to protect all people including children and women 
against slavery.
311
 As discussed in preceding paragraphs and also in chapter 3 of this thesis, 
SEAs of women and children can be seen as a form of modern slavery. Thus, SEA is 
prohibited under this Article. Moreover, Article 24 (1) of ICCPR recognizes the right of the 
child and reaffirms the protection of children. It indicates that "[e]very child shall have, 
without any discrimination as to race, color, sex, language, religion, national, or social origin, 
property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a 
minor, on the part of his family, society and the state". 
312
 In this regard, the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) issued General Comment No.17
313
 which indicates that the rights provided 
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for in article 24 are not the only ones recognized for children, as every child also enjoys all 
civil rights proclaimed in ICCPR.
314
 It also emphasizes on taking all required social and 
economic measures to prevent children "from being subjected to acts of violence and cruel 
and inhuman treatment or from being exploited by means of forced labour or prostitution".
315
 
     ICCPR regulates the application of its obligations in Article 2 (1), where States parties 
undertake to respect and ensure the rights recognized in ICCPR to 'all individuals within their 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction'.
316
 There has been a discussion as to whether the term 
'and' is to be understood in a connecting or conjunctive way. Some scholars find that the 
travaux preparatoires indicate an unaccomplished effort to delete the term 'within its 
territory' or to substitute 'or' for 'and'; this since it was worried that such changes might 
require the States parties to protect individuals, who are subject to their jurisdiction but living 
abroad, against the illegal conducts of the foreign territorial sovereign. This was deemed 
impossible for a State to do so.
317
  
    The ICJ addressed this issue in its advisory opinion in the Wall Case
318
, where Israeli 
obligations under inter alia the ICCPR were considered as applicable to that territory.
319
 The 
court here stressed that 'the exercise of jurisdiction is primarily territorial',
320
 but it indicated 
that jurisdiction "may sometimes be exercised outside the national territory. Considering the 
object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it would seem 
natural that, even when such is the case, States parties to the Covenant should be bound to 
comply with its provisions".
321
 It is nevertheless submitted by some commentators that the 
highly unusual length of the Israeli occupation may have influence on ICJ opinion.
322
 
Overall, the majority view gives the ICCPR extraterritorial application. As regards the 
applicability of the ICCPR to PSOs, the HRC has found that it also applies there.
323
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    Apart from universal attempts to protect children and women' rights relating to the 
prohibition of SEA, there are also regional HR protection systems. The most developed 
system of its kind is the European ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is 
its regional enforcement mechanism.
324
 In fact, it is the operational arm of the ECHR and is 
vested with the power to sanction against delinquent States.
325
 
    The ECHR contains some provisions of relevance to SEAs. First of all, according to the 
Article 3 torture, inhuman and degrading treatment is forbidden.
326
 SEA of women and 
children can be seen as acts covered by that article. Secondly, Article 4(1) provides that "[n]o 
one shall be held in slavery or servitude".
327
 Interestingly, derogations from the provision of 
Article 3 and 4 (1) is not allowed even in emergency situation.
328
 Finally, Article 13 
recognizes the right to an effective remedy and states that "[e]veryone whose rights and 
freedoms as set forth in this convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in 
an official capacity".
329
 Thus, according to the latter, if UN PSO personnel commit SEA and 
such acts are attributable to a TCS, victims can seek redress before a national authority of the 
TCS since the person may have an arguable claim of his/hers rights under Articles 3 and 4 (1) 
of ECHR having been violated.
330
 
    ECHR regulates the application of its obligations in Article 1 which provides that "[t]he 
High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in section 1 of this Convention".
331
 According to the travaux preparatoires 
the term 'residing within the territories' was replaced by the Expert Intergovernmental 
Committee with the term 'everyone within their jurisdiction' in order to extend the benefits of 
the ECHR to all persons within the jurisdiction of the States parties, even those who could 
not be considered as residing there in the legal sense of the words.
332
  
    Extraterritorial application of the ECHR has been considered by many cases, especially the 
Bankovic Case
333
 and the Al-Skeini Case
334
, where it is furthermore emphasized that the 
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jurisdictional competence of State parties under Article 1 of ECHR is primarily territorial.
335
 
The two established exceptions are here where one State Party holds authority and controls 
over a person (agent), and where a State Party has effective control over a foreign territory.
336
  
    All in all, in connection with SEA committed by PSO personnel lent to the UN by States, 
TCSs may incur international responsibility.   
 
2 Responsibility of Troop Contributing States under DARS  
The ILC decided in 1975 to work extensively on draft articles relating to the responsibility of 
States. The draft articles were separated into three parts. The first part was meant to deal with 
the origins of international responsibility, whereas the second part was meant to deal with the 
content, forms and degrees of international responsibility, and the third part was intended to 
deal with the settlement of disputes and the implementation of international responsibility. 
Part I was provisionally adopted by the ILC in 1980 and DARS was finally adopted on 9 
August 2001.
337
    
   Although there is a wide range of State practice in relation to international responsibility of 
States,
338
  DARS has not been adopted as a formally binding convention, and chances are 
good that it will not be adopted as such either. The aim of drafting these Articles was to have 
the UNGA pays close attention to this issue and also to drawn the attention of States to it.
339
 
However, although DARS as such is not legally binding, it to a large extent reflects 
customary international law.
340
As held by Larsen: "[A]ll draft Articles have been submitted 
for comments by governments and others, and this procedure has provided fairly reliable 
conclusions about state practice and opinio juris of the states. Nevertheless, each article must 
in principle be viewed in light of the general requirements for the establishment of customary 
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In the ICJ judgment concerning the Application of the Genocide Convention
342
 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina V. Serbia and Montenegro),
343
 the ICJ explicitly stated that customary law on 
international responsibility is found in Articles 4 and 8 of DARS.
344
 The Court here 
nevertheless indicates that it "does not see itself required to decide at this stage whether the 
ILC’s Articles dealing with attribution, apart from Articles 4 and 8, express present 
customary international law, it being clear that none of them apply in this case".
345
 
    Thus, the ICJ's opinion in the above-mentioned judgment supports Larsen's statement. 
Individual articles must therefore be considered separately to see whether it reflects 
customary international law.  
    The most essential principle of international responsibility of States is manifested in 
Article 1 which indicates that "[e]very internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State".
346
 This principle is widely supported by practice 
and hence it reflects customary international law.
347
 The elements of an internationally 
wrongful act of a State are provided under Article 2. It defines the internationally wrongful 
conduct as an act or omission which is attributable to the State under international law and 
which constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State.
348
 Hence, a conduct in 
breach of an international obligation will not entail the international responsibility of a State 
unless it is also attributable to that State. Chapter II of DARS follows up on this and defines 
the circumstances under which conduct is attributable to a State. 
   Under Article 4, conduct of any State organ – including any person or entity having that 
status in accordance with the internal law of the State – shall be considered as an act of the 
State concerned under international law, irrespective of whether the organ exercises 
legislative, executive, judicial or any other function, whatever position it holds within the 
State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government or of a territorial unit 
of the State is.
349
 According to Shaw, this approach reflects customary international law,
350
 
and the ICJ supports Shaw's statement in its judgment on Immunity from Legal Process 
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indicating that "[a]ccording to a well-established rule of international law, the conduct of any 
organ of a state must be regarded as an act of that state".
351
 It moreover pointed out that this 
rule is of customary character.
352
 ICJ also reiterated the same view 8 years later in its 
judgment on the Application of the Genocide Convention.
353
   
    Notably, it is a well-known fact that Article 43 of the UNC
354
, which calls on all Member 
States to make armed forces available to the UNSC, has never been put into effect. So, the 
UN has no standing forces at its disposal.
355
 Thus, armed forces sent to PSOs by TCS are 
clearly their organs
356
 and so prima facie fall within the scope of Article 4 of DARS which is 
the elemental principle on attribution of conduct to the States. However, the military forces of 
TCSs do not act merely on behalf of the State during PSOs. They are, to varying degrees, 
placed at the disposal of and under the control and direction of another entity such as the UN. 
Thus, the issue of attribution of the conduct of PSOs personnel to another entity than the 
State will arise.
357
    
    Under Article 5, the conduct of a person or of an entity - not an organ of a State under 
Article 4 - empowered by the internal law of that State to exercise elements of governmental 
authority shall be considered as an act of that State under international law, provided the 
person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.
358
 It appears that this 
provision covers, inter alia, the situation of privatized corporations which hold specific 
public or regulatory functions.
359
 For example, in some countries, the conduct of private 
security firms authorized to act as prison guards is included in the aforementioned provision 
as in that capacity they may exercise public powers of detention and discipline subsequent to 
a judicial sentence or prison regulation.
360
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     Article 5 issues may arise, as Shaw observes, in situations where an organ or an agent of a 
State, such as its military contingent, is placed at the disposal of another international legal 
entity, such as the UN, in a situation, such as PSOs, where both the State and the entity 
exercise elements of control and a certain jurisdiction over the organ or agent in question.
361
 
Therefore, it is not enough to be an organ of a State in order to impose responsibility on the 
State – that State must have exercised some extent of control over the organ. 
    Article 6, however, provides that in a situation where an organ of a State is placed at the 
disposal of another State – not any other legal entity such as international organization like in 
particular the UN - and exercises elements of the governmental authority of the latter State; 
the conduct of the organ is therefore considered as the conduct of the State at whose disposal 
it is placed.
362
 The commentary to this provision limits the application of Article 6 to a 
specific situation. It follows that 
"[t]he words 'placed at the disposal of' in article 6 express the essential condition that 
must be met in order for the conduct of the organ to be regarded under international law 
as an act of the receiving and not of the sending State. The notion of an organ 'placed at 
the disposal of' the receiving State is a specialized one, implying that the organ is acting 
with consent, under the authority of and for the purposes of the receiving State. Not only 
must the organ be appointed to perform functions appertaining to the State at whose 
disposal it is placed. [But] [i]n performing the functions entrusted to it by the beneficiary 
State, the organ must also act in conjunction with machinery of that State and under its 




    This provision is of little relevance to the situation of contemporary PSOs due to the fact 
that TCSs normally place their forces at the disposal of the UN and not that of another State. 
Moreover, it is improbable that a TCS will place its forces under the 'exclusive direction and 
control' of another State even if the peace operation is authorized by the UN to act under 
unified command of the latter State.
364
 In such operations the personnel of TCSs are not 
integrated into the forces of the commanding State in the sense required by Article 6.
365
 
    An unlawful act of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered by the State to 
exercise elements of its governmental authority is attributable to that State under international 
law, as provided for by Article 7, even if the organ, person or entity exceeds its authority or 
contravenes instructions providing that it acts in that capacity;
366
  in the sense that the 
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officials act "at least to all appearances as competent officials or organs or they must have 
used powers or methods appropriated to their official capacity".
367
 Thus, during PSOs, if the 
personnel of PSOs forces commit misconduct which is otherwise attributable to a TCS, by 
exceeding their authority or infringing instructions, that TCS incurs international 
responsibility providing that the personnel acted in their official capacity. It seems that this 
Article falls into the objective theory regarding State responsibility, discussed above, and lays 
down an absolute and strict rule of liability.
368
 
    As a general principle, the conduct of private persons or entities such as companies, or 
enterprises State-owned and controlled – but which are nevertheless not the organ of a State - 
is not attributable to that State unless there is a special factual relationship between them and 
the State.
369
 There are two situations under Article 8, which reflects customary international 
law
370
, where the conduct of private persons and entities is attributable to it; when these act 
on the instructions of the State or under the State's direction and control.
371
 It is therefore 
clear that Article 8 of DARS is of merely indirect relevance in the context of PSOs in so far 
as it only concerns the attribution of the conduct of a private person or entity which is not an 
organ or agent of a State, while forces acting in PSOs are organs of that State and so are not 
directly included in this Article.
372
 
     However, the relevance of this Article rests on its influence on relevant provisions in 
DARIO.
373
 As was discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, there is a clear connection between 
effective control and the attribution of conduct in the context of PSOs, and consequently 
international responsibility lies where effective control is vested. According to the 
commentary on Article 8 of DARS, the terms 'instructions', 'direction', and 'control' express 
alternative relationships and it is sufficient to establish any of them in order to attribute the 
conduct of a private person or entity to the State. Furthermore, they must be related to the 
conduct which contributes to the internationally wrongful act.
374
 Before moving forward, it is 
worthwhile to mention that there are several articles in DARIO which seem to establish 
concurrent responsibility for both the international organization – the UN to the purpose of 
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    According to Larsen, "the requirement of 'direction and control' refers, in particular, to the 
'effective control' test [...which] provides a high threshold for the attribution of conduct of 
non-state entities to the state".
376
 It appears, as the commentary to this provision indicates, 
that the effective control test implies that this principle does not extend to conducts which are 
incidentally or in a circumferential manner associated with an operation.
377
 Thus, to attribute 
a conduct to a TCS in PSOs, the conduct should be an integral part of the operation and 
carried out under effective direction or control of a State.   
    The attribution of authorized conduct and the degree of control are widely considered in 
international jurisprudence.
378
 For example, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case
379
 stated that 
although the US provided the contras with heavy subsidies and other support, there was no 
clear evidence of the US having exercised such a degree of control in all fields to justify that 
the contras had acted on the behalf of the US.
380
 It emphasized that having the effective 
control of military or paramilitary operations in which HR or IHR are violated is essential to 
establish the international responsibility of a State.
381
 It explains the degree of effective 
control as follows: 
          "The Court has taken the view [...]  that United States participation, even if preponderant 
or decisive, in the financing, organizing, training, supplying and equipping of the contras, 
the selection of its military or paramilitary targets, and the planning of the whole of its 
operation, is still insufficient in itself, on the basis of the evidence in the possession of the 
Court, for the purpose of attributing to the United States the acts committed by the 
contras in the course of their military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. All the 
forms of United States participation mentioned above, and even the general control by the 
respondent State over a force with a high degree of dependency on it, would not in 
themselves mean, without further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the 
perpetration of the acts contrary to human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the 
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applicant State. Such acts could well be committed by members of the contras without the 




    However, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) addressed the issue in the Tadic case
383
 and took a different position from 
the ICJ. It used the 'overall control' test which is more lenient and flexible than the 'effective 
control' test. The former test was primarily used by ICTY to qualify an armed conflict as 
international. That is, if a foreign State exercises overall control over a group which is 
involved in a prima facie non-international armed conflict, this conflict is transformed into an 
international armed conflict.
384
 But the Appeal Chamber also suggested that the test is 
relevant for the attribution of conduct of non-state entities to a State: 
 
          "In the light of the above discussion, the following conclusion may be safely reached. In 
the case at issue, given that the Bosnian Serb armed forces constituted a “military 
organization”, the control of the FRY authorities over these armed forces required by 
international law for considering the armed conflict to be international was overall control 
going beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also 
participation in the planning and supervision of military operations. By contrast, 
international rules do not require that such control should extend to the issuance of 
specific orders or instructions relating to single military actions, whether or not such 




        In the Genocide case
386
, the ICJ took that same position as it has in the earlier 
Nicaragua case. The court states that "the “overall control” test has the major drawback 
of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle 
governing the law of international responsibility",
387
 and this test cannot be used to 
establish international responsibility for States.
388
 It holds that the responsibility of a 
State arises where a person or entity on whatever basis acts on behalf of it. Therefore, 
the act of official organs of a State, or of persons or entities which are not formally 
recognized as official organs under internal law but may nevertheless be equated with 
State organs due to their complete dependence on the State, or of persons and entities 
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under Article 8 of DARS, is attributable to that State.
389
 ICJ continues that the latter is 
so "where an organ of the State gave the instructions or provided the direction pursuant 
to which the perpetrators of the wrongful act acted or where it exercised effective 
control over the action during which the wrong was committed. In this regard the 
“overall control” test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the 




    This issue has also been considered by the ECtHR. In the Loizidou case
391
, which shows 
that military occupation is the prominent instance of land control
392
, the court states that 
 
         "[i]t is not necessary to determine whether […] Turkey actually exercises detailed control 
over the policies and actions of the authorities of the [Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC)]. It is obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties 
in northern Cyprus
393
 […] that her army exercises effective overall control
394
 over that 
part of the island. Such control, according to the relevant test and in the circumstances of 
the case, entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the "TRNC". Those 





    In sum, it seems that the 'effective control' test applied by the ICJ in the Nicaragua and 
Genocide cases and most probably by the ECtHR in the Loizidou case is the proper test under 
Article 8 of DARS. As was mentioned in preceding paragraphs, although Article 8 is of 
indirect relevance in the context of PSOs since it refers to private persons or entities while 
PSOs forces are the organs of TCSs, its relevance is revealed in its influence on relevant rules 
in DARIO where the responsibility rests with ECC. Thus, although under Article 4 of DARS 
the conduct of PSOs forces is attributable to TCSs, in connection with Article 8, DARIO 
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effective control.  
395 ECtHR, Loizidou Case (Grand Chamber) 1996, op. cit. p.18, para. 56. 
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provisions and owing to the fact that the UN exercises some degree of ECC over PSOs forces, 
it is nevertheless true that TCSs must exercise some degree of ECC over their organs placed 
at the disposal of an organization in order for them to be held responsible for their troop’s 
misconduct.  
    Thus, it may be true that, as discussed in chapter 3,
396
 there is dual responsibility where 
both the UN and TCSs exercise an amount of ECC over PSOs forces. The amount of ECC 
might, however, vary according to the circumstances of each specific case. Thus, SEAs 


























                                                           
396 See Chapter 3 of current thesis, pp. 34-35. 
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Chapter 6: The Possibility of filing a Claim against the United Nations and the Issue of 
Redressing Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuses 
As was discussed in chapter three, the UN is bound by HR obligations under its own 
constitutive document and customary international law. But, this does not ensure a forum in 
which victims of SEAs can file claims against the UN. Actually, the question is whether it is 
possible to sue the UN at all. As held by Wouters and Others, there is no international 
tribunal that generally has jurisdiction over international organizations - i.a the UN- because 
of the immunity traditionally bestowed upon them.
397
 Much case-law show that immunity of 
international organizations - the UN for the purpose of this thesis - is permissible in as much 
as there exists reasonable alternative means to protect victims' rights effectively.
398
 Such 
cases try to reconcile individual rights with rights of the international organizations.
399
 
However, the question is whether national courts constitute an appropriate forum to assess the 
specificities of dispute settlement mechanisms which should have been set up by international 
organizations. Moreover, interference by a national judiciary may threaten the independence 
of the UN in accomplishing its functions and missions. Additionally, even if a victim could 
obtain a judgment which convicts the UN, the possibility of the enforcement of the national 
decision is questionable.
400
 In subsequent sections, the possibility of suing the UN, the issue 
of redressing victims of SEAs, and the ongoing so-called Cholera Complaint
401
 - as an 
example of what may be done in SEAs cases - will be discussed.   
 
1 The Possibility of Filing a Suit against the United Nations 
It is clear that international organizations, i.a the UN, cannot be sued before regional or 
international judicial tribunals, since these only cater for cases against States.
402
 There are 
therefore clear limitations on the bringing of a case against the UN before a third party 
dispute settlement system. Moreover, according to the statutes of the ICJ only States can be 
                                                           
397 Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, and Schmitt Pierre " Accountability for Human Rights Violations by 
International Organizations: Introductory Remarks" in Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, and Schmitt Pierre (eds.) 
"Accountability For Human Rights Violations by International Organizations, Oxford: intersentia, 2010, 1-18, p. 11. 
398 Council of Europe, ECtHR, Case of Beer and Regan v. Germany, Application No. 28934/95, Judgment, 1999, p. 3 
available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58912#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58912%22]} ;  
Council of Europe, ECtHR, Case of waite and Kennedy v. Germany, Application No. 26083/94, Judgment, 1999, p. 261. 
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58912#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-58912%22]}.  
399 Wouters, Jan and Others, op. cit. pp.11-12. 
400  Ibid. p. 12. 
401 United States Distict Court, Southern Districtt of New York, Class Civil Action, Delama Georgesand Others v. the United 
Nations and Others regarding Cholera Outbreak in Haiti (Cholera Complaint), Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-07146-JPO, 9 
October 2013. 1-67, Available at:   http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Cholera-Complaint.pdf; for an 
overview regarding the events which led to this complaint see   http://www.ijdh.org/2013/10/topics/health/cholera-
complaint-against-the-un/#.U1d0APmSx8F.  
402 It should be noted that the European Union will become an exemption against which lawsuit can be filed before ECtHR, 
when the negotiations with the Council of Europe has been finished regarding accession under ECHR Art. 59(2).   
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parties in cases before the court.
403
 The TCS as Member States can nevertheless be sued 
either before regional and international judicial bodies or/and their own domestic courts, and 
the bringing of Member States before relevant courts is an indirect way to secure the 
responsibility of international organizations such as the UN. One may argue that although it 
is a short-term option, it would practically evade immunities enjoyed by international 
organizations as such.
404
 However, as the issue here is the possibility of filing a case against 
the UN itself, the possibility of suing Member States in order to target UN accountability
405
 
will not be covered further. And since the UN only offers a poor internal redress 
mechanism
406
 - under article VIII section 29 of 1946 Convention on the Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN)
407
, the only possibility is to sue the UN before a 
domestic court.
408
 Having said that, the main barrier, limiting claims against the UN before 
national courts, is the privileges and immunities which the UN enjoys. 
 
1-1 Privileges and Immunities Enjoyed by the United Nations 
It is generally accepted that international organizations may enjoy privileges and immunities. 
Although international organizations have in a few cases been endowed with the same 
immunities as States by analogy in the literature or jurisprudence, these are different, in the 
vast majority of cases, from the rules applicable for States.
409
 For example, the immunity of 
international organizations is absolute unless waived by the organization itself, while that of 
States is not absolute and excludes commercial activities.
410
 
    An international organization such as the UN requires certain privileges and immunities to 
perform its functions effectively and to secure the international character of its personality. 
                                                           
403 See this thesis Chapter 1, p. 5. The possibility of referring a dispute to an ad hoc international tribunal to have it settled 
through arbitration either ICJ advisory opinion, are the ways which suits settlement of disputes between the UN and States. 
But they are not work for victims of SEA to complain against the UN.  
404 Tondini, Matteo "The 'Italian Job': How to Make International Organizations Compliant with Human Rights and 
Accountable for Their Violation by Targeting Member States" in Wouters, Jan, Brems, Eva, Smis, Stefaan, and Schmitt 
Pierre (eds.) "Accountability For Human Rights Violations by International Organizations, Oxford: intersentia, 2010, 169- 
212, p. 171.  
405 For more information in this regard see Ibid. pp. 180- 201. 
406 Ibid. p. 171; see also Ibid., pp. 174-176; Neumann, Peter "Immunity of International Organizations and Alternative 
Remedies against the United Nations" Seminar on State immunity, Summer Semester, 2006, Institute for International Law, 
Vienna university, 1-29, pp. 10-11. Available at: 
https://intlaw.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/int_beziehungen/Internetpubl/neumann.pdf 
407  UNGA, Convention on the Privileges and immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN), 13 February 1946, United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vol.1, 15- 32, No. 4. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ethics/pdf/convention.pdf   
408 The prerequisite for any claim against the international organisation, i.a. the UN, is its recognition as a subject of 
international law that possesses international legal personality. See this thesis chapter, pp.11-14; Tondini, Matteo, op. cit. 
pp.172 - 173.  
409 Naert, Frederik, op.cit. pp. 365- 366. 
410 Ibid. p. 366. 
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Furthermore, these immunities help it to uphold its interdependence from its Member 
States.
411
   
 
1-1-1 Sources 
There are three different sources, namely, treaties, customary international law, and national 
law, from which the privileges and immunities of international organizations may emanate.
412
  
    There are three types of treaties which deal with the privileges and immunities of the UN. 
First of all, the UNC provides basic provisions requiring Member States to endow the UN 
with immunities.
413
 As the Secretary-General states, the entitlement of the UN and its 
officials to immunities is explicitly enshrined in Article 105, paragraph 2, of the UNC.
414
 
This Article provides that the UN, its officials, and the representatives of Member States are 
to enjoy such privileges and immunities which are necessary for the independent exercise of 
their functions in connection with the organization.
415
 The other source is general multilateral 
agreements dealing with the privileges and immunities of the UN, namely, CPIUN and the 
1947 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies
416
. They are 
considered as a supplement to the more basic provisions of the UNC.
417
 Last but not least, 
there are many bilateral agreements between the UN and individual States in which the UN is 
situated or performs a particular mission such as PSOs. These are typically referred to as 
SOFAs. Interestingly, such States need not be Member States of the UN. 
418
 
    In the absence of treaty obligations, customary international law calls on States to grant 
international organizations privileges and immunities. This has been recognized by both the 
national courts of member and non-Member States and includes the provisions which are 
necessary for an organization to perform its functions.
419
 In the case of the UN, nevertheless, 
there is no need for customary international law to recognize privileges and immunities as 
                                                           
411 Akande, Dapo, op. cit. p. 271. 
412 Ibid. pp. 272-273. 
413 Ibid. p. 272. 
414 General Assembly, Report of the Secretary – General on the Procedures in Place for Implementation of Article VIII, 
Section 29, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly on 
13 February 1946 (1995 Secretary – General's Report hereinafter) , UN Doc. A/C.5/49/65 of 24 April 1995, 1-14, p. 10, 
para. 25. Available at : http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.5/49/65   
415 UNC, op. cit. Article 105. It provides: "1. The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purpose. 2. Representatives of the Members of the United 
Nations and officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the 
independent exercise of their functions in connexion with the Organization. 3. The General Assembly may make 
recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article or may 
propose conventions to the Members of the United Nations for this purpose". 
416 UNGA,  Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies, 21 November 1947, United Nations 
Treaty Series, Vo. 33, 261- 291. Available at: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/cpiun-cpisa/cpiun-cpisa.html   





there are treaty obligations in this regard and almost all States are parties to the UNC. 
Moreover, since an international organization such as the UN enjoys immunities and 
privileges within the territory and national legal order of a State, many States have enacted 
domestic laws governing such privileges and immunities.
420
      
 
1-1-2 Scope  
Privileges and immunities most commonly derive from treaties. As Akande states, there are 
significant similarities in the content of these treaties which allows customary international 
law to develop.
421
 Although most treaties grant privileges and immunities to the UN itself, to 
its officials including experts on missions, and to representatives of Member States or 
exceptionally of other bodies of the UN,
422
 only privileges and immunities of the UN itself
423
 
will be covered here.  
    Obviously, the immunity which precludes law suits against the UN - by e.g. victims of 
SEAs - in national courts is the immunity from judicial jurisdiction. The UN is granted an 
absolute immunity from the judicial jurisdiction of States under Article II of the CPIUN.
424
 It 
provides that "[t]he United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in 
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity shall extend to any particular case it 
has expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of immunity 
shall extend to any measure of execution".
425
 The UN itself can waive this immunity by 
consenting ad hoc to the proceeding or in a more regular manner through SOFAs. 
    Some have sought to restrict the absolute nature of the UN's immunity. It has been argued 
that it may amount to injustice where there is no alternative means for individual victims to 
be redressed; the granted immunity should therefore be conditional on the presence of 
alternative methods of resolving disputes and other means of obtaining redress.
426
 Moreover, 
relying on an analogy with States' immunity, one may also argue that such immunity should 
be granted to an international organization such as the UN only in relation to sovereign 
exercises and not in relation to commercial or private ones. The latter limits the immunity of 
                                                           
420 Ibid. p. 273. 
421 Ibid.  
422 Ibid.  
423 Privileges and immunities of the UN encompass immunity from the jurisdiction, immunity from execution, inviolability 
of premises, property, and archives, Currency and fiscal privileges, and freedom of communication. However, immunity 
from the jurisdiction is considered in this section since the issue of suing the UN is centered to this thesis. For further 
information see Ibid. pp. 271- 281.  
424 Neumann, Peter, op. cit. pp. 9-10.  
425 CPIUN, op. cit. Article II, Section 2.  
426 Akande, Dapo, op. cit. pp. 273- 274. 
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the UN from an absolute to a restricted one. 
427
 Both arguments are merely de lege ferenda 
since they are not in accordance with the treaty obligations providing immunities for the UN. 
Besides, the UN is not a sovereign entity and does not exercise sovereign authority although 
it is composed of sovereign States.
428
 Indeed, this immunity is granted to the UN to protect its 
official functional activities rather than public or sovereign acts as such.
429
  
    Accordingly, the victims of SEA cannot take legal action against the UN before domestic 
courts although the UN may be at least co-responsible for SEAs committed by the personnel 
of PSOs. However, as previously mentioned, there is a possibility for the UN waiving its 
immunity by agreeing to the judicial proceeding or by withdrawing from its immunities when 
concluding SOFAs. 
     It is also worthwhile to note that even if there might be a possibility for suing the UN 
before national courts, according to the CPIUN, the UN still possesses immunity from 
enforcement jurisdiction or measures execution, which prevents the seizure or pre-attachment 
of its property or other assets.
430
 These may nevertheless of course also be waived by the UN 
itself. The latter needs a separate and express consent of the UN.
431
   
 
2 Redressing Victims of Sexual Exploitations and Abuse 
There is general agreement on the urgent need for a strategy of assistance to victims of SEA 
committed by PSO personnel. However, to date, there has not been a clear system through 
which such victims could be redressed.
432
 Unfortunately, the UN insists that it bears no legal 
liability itself for SEAs committed by its PSO personnel.
433
 It seems that the UN merely 
undertakes a commitment of assisting and supporting victims and children born as a result of 
SEAs to get redress.
434
 For example, according to the Zeid Report, victims of SEAs should be 
provided with effective mechanisms by the UN to lodge complaints against UN personnel – 
not against the UN itself - in confidential settings.
435
 
                                                           
427 Neumann, Peter, op. cit. p. 4 ; Akande, Dapo, op. cit. pp. 273- 274. 
428 Ibid. p. 274; Neumann, Peter, op. cit. pp. 2-3. 
429 Ibid. p. 9; Akande, Dapo, op. cit. p. 274.  
430 CPIUN, op. cit. Article II, Section 3. It provides that: "The premises of the United Nations shall be inviolable. The 
property and assets of the of the United Nations, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from reach, 
requisition, confiscation, expropriation, and any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or 
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431 Akande, Dapo, op. cit. pp. 274- 275. 
432 Defeis, Elizabeth F., op. cit. p. 210. 
433 Ibid. 
434 The Secretary- General "Draft United Nations Policy Statement and Draft United Nations Comprehensive Strategy on 
Assistance and Support to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by United Nations Staff or Related Personnel (Draft 
Victim Assistance Policy hereinafter) June 2006, UN Doc. A/60/877, 1-21, pp. 4, Part A, para 3. Available at: http://daccess-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/376/36/PDF/N0637636.pdf?OpenElement  
435 Zeid Report, op. cit. p. 18, para 40. 
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2-1 Providing Assistance and Support to the Victims 
According to the Draft Victim Assistance Policy, financial and technical support range from 
emergency assistance and include "medical and psychosocial support, to more comprehensive 
assistance, such as educational opportunities or skills training and, in certain cases, financial 
support".
436
 Furthermore, in cases where the alleged act of SEA constitutes a crime, the UN 
will also assist alleged victims to pursue the case with the national authorities.
437
 The UN will 
also work with community-based organizations to raise awareness of the rights and needs of 
complainants, victims and children fathered by UN PSOs personnel.
438
 Notably, as held by 
the Zeid Report, the UN should encourage the victims who have credible evidence to have 
the paternity established to seek a court order for support. But in the lack of a functioning 
legal system, where the PSOs is deployed the General Assembly could adopt a resolution 
which requests the Secretary-General to proclaim rules enabling him, where the victim has 
credible evidence, to offer to obtain a DNA test of the child in order to prove whether the 
allegation is well founded.
439
    
    Due to the problems with making UN responsibility a reality, the Draft Victim Assistance 
Policy recommends that in order to fund such assistance, the UN should establish a funding 
mechanism through a centralized 'Headquarters-based trust fund'.
440
 These funds would be 
contributed to by 'departments, agencies fund and programs' within the UN and also by 
TCSs.
441
 Additionally, the Zeid Report suggests that the daily allowance of soldiers found 
guilty of SEA to be seized in order to contribute towards the trust fund.
442
 It continues that 
the TCS then can recoup those sums from the soldiers concerned, since it has inter alia 




2-2 Non-Contractual Claims for Remedies through an Internal Mechanism     
Under Article VIII, Section 29, of the CPIUN, the UN shall make provisions for appropriate 
modes of settlements and respond to the claims arising from contacts, other disputes of a 
private law character (non-contractual claims), and disputes involving its officials enjoying 
immunity if their immunity has not been waived by the Secretary-General.
444
 The 1995 
                                                           
436 Draft Victim Assistance Policy, op. cite. p. 5, Part A, para 8. 
437 Ibid.; see also ibid. p. 12, Part B. para 18, 20. 
438 Ibid. p. 16, Part B,  para 34. 
439 Zeid Report, op. cit. p. 26, para 76; see also Draft Victim Assistance Policy, op. cit. p. 14, Part B,  para 26. 
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Secretary General's Report refers to, inter alia, claims of a private law character including 
claims related to the conduct of UN PSOs. Within the context of PSOs, the UN has envisaged 
claims or disputes of a private law character in relation to two categories.
445
 The first 
category includes claims for compensation submitted by third parties for personal injury or 
death and/or property loss or damage, resulted from conduct of members of a UN PSOs 
within the "mission area" concerned. The second category consists of claims arising out of 
any kinds of commercial contracts into which the UN has entered, in order to meet the 
requirements of a PSO.
446
 It seems that the redressing of victims of SEAs, committed by the 
personnel of PSOs, falls into the former category. 
    In this regard, under the Model SOFA, a standing claims commission will be established 
for the purpose of settling such claims.
447
 However, such claims have to date been settled 
without resort to the establishment of a claims commission.
448
   
    Concerning past and present PSOs, it has been the practice to establish in the mission an 
internal local claims review board, on the basis of authority delegated by the Controller
449
, to 
examine and recommend settlement of third-party claims.
450
 When the settlement amount 
offered by the board exceeds the financial limits set out in the applicable delegation of 
authority, the related claim will be referred to UN Headquarters by the PSO concerned.
451
 
Then, the offers of the board are reviewed by the Field Operations Division, Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, which, in turn, forwards them to the Director of the Peacekeeping 
Financing Division, Office of Program Planning, Budget and Accounts for review and 
approval.
452
 After approval, the claimant is paid against the execution of a release form 
indicating that the claimant agrees to be compensated and holds harmless the UN, its officials 
and agents, any and all claims and causes of action by third parties arising from or relating to 
the injuries or loss at issue. 
453
  
    It appears that the compensation is very dependent on the approval of a representative of 
the entity against which the claim has been made. Additionally, the claimant has to sign the 
forms described above in return for compensation. Generally, internal redressing mechanisms 
are neither impartial nor effective and thus does not fully satisfy the need to redress victims; 
                                                           
445 1995 Secretary-General's Report, op. cit. p. 6, para. 15. 
446 Ibid. 
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since the UN may considers its interests more than those of victims and victims may accept 
whatever the UN offers because of fear of its consequences or because of the lack of any 
other way to be compensated even partially.              
    In sum, to date, neither Zeid's recommendations nor the Draft Victim Assistance Policy 
have been implemented by the UN in order to provide the victims with assistance and 
support.
454
 As Defeis states "[t]he concern that such assistance might constitute an admission 
of peacekeeper misconduct has contributed to the delay".
455
 When also taking into account 
that the UN limits its assistance and support to the situations where the identity of the UN 
personnel allegedly having committed SEA is unknown,
456
 the only way available for victims 
to become fairly redressed is by suing the UN before a national court. Although, as 
previously discussed, the latter holds some restrictions and obstacles, it works best where the 
UN does not acknowledge its responsibility itself – if it had waived its immunity by any 
means before.  
 
3 The Cholera Complaint 
In 2013, the UN was sued in a national court – the Southern District of New York federal 
court - in regard to the Cholera epidemic spread by the United Nations Stabilization Mission 
in Haiti (MINUSTAH) which caused the death of over 7000 Haitians in 18 month and has 
also infected hundreds of thousands – almost 1 in every 20 Haitians.
457
 This groundbreaking 
case is one of the largest cases ever to seek justice for UN wrongdoing.
458
 The Cholera 
Complaint has impact and implications beyond Haiti, since it challenges the UN to establish 
mechanisms in order to uphold its commitment to be a universal leader in accountability and 
promotion of human rights for all.
459
 It is also an exemplary case which addresses legal 
aspects of relevance to cases concerning SEAs.  
 
3-1 The UN Role in Cholera Outbreak 
Numerous studies, including those of the UN itself, have shown that in 2010 Vibrio cholera 
virus was introduced to Haitian waters by MINUSTAH personnel.
460
 MINUSTAH is a PSO 
and parts of its personnel were deployed to Haiti from Nepal, where cholera is endemic. As 
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reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, until the arrival of MINUSTAH 
peacekeepers, Haiti had not reported a single case of cholera for over 200 years.
461
 
    Although the UN knew that Nepal was experiencing a wave of cholera infection at that 
time, the Nepali peacekeepers were neither tested nor treated for cholera prior to deployment 
to Haiti.
462
 The peacekeepers were stationed on a base in rural Mirebalais which maintained 
dangerous sanitation conditions, allowing human waste to pollute a stream that runs just 
meters from the base and into the Artibonite River - Haiti’s primary water source.
463
 
Neighbors in the area reported disgusting smell arising from the camp, and later a UN 
investigation revealed that the drain water piping at the base was “haphazard” and 




3-2 Claim for Compensation: Petition for Relief  
The first step taken towards compensation of cholera outbreak victims was the filing of a 
claim, requesting relief and reparations against the UN. This claim, known as Petition for 
Relief, was filed against both MINUSTAH and the UN by the Bureau Des Advocats 
Internationaux (BAI) and Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) in November 
2011. The Petition for Relief has been filed on behalf of over 5,000 victims of cholera in 
Haiti, who are the petitioners in this matter.
465
 In fact, the Petition for Relief is not a claim 
before a judicial body and is in accordance with the procedures set out in the SOFA between 
the UN and the government of Haiti (SOFAH hereinafter).
466
  
    As is pointed out in the Petition for Relief, the catastrophic outbreak of cholera is directly 
attributable to the "negligence, gross negligence, recklessness and deliberate indifference for 
health and lives of Haiti's citizens"
467
 by the UN and its subsidiary organ, MINUSTAH.
468
 
Admittedly, the facts and law dictate that UN's failures constitute negligence as such and it 
retains institutional liability for all conducts alleged that spread cholera virus in Haiti.
469
  
                                                           




465   Ibid. 
466 Petition for Relief, op. cit. p. 16; Agreement between The United Nations and the Government of Haiti Concerning the 
Status Of the United Nations Operation in Haiti (SOFAH hereinafter),Volume 2271, 1-40460, 251-263. Available at: 
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for Relief, op. cit. p. 17.   
467 Ibid. pp. 1, 18. 
468 Ibid. p.1. 
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    The following facts and obligations would seem to show UN's negligence. First of all, the 
UN had a duty to screen troops for cholera infection and test them prior to deployment from 
Nepal. But the UN failed to carry out such tests for individuals who did not exhibit active 
symptoms.
470
 Secondly, the UN infringed its duty to maintain an adequate standard of its 
sanitation facilities and waste disposal at the Mirebalais camp which thus allowed cholera-
infected fecal contamination to entered the Artibonite River.
471
 Third, the UN failed to 
conduct proper water quality testing and allowed testing equipment to fall into disrepair. 
Finally, the UN failed to take immediate corrective action and wilfully delayed investigation 
and timely access to the cholera outbreak's source.
472
 
    The UN failed to comply with both the SOFAH and HR. Under Article VII para. 54 and 
Article VIII para. 55 of SOFAH, the UN has jurisdiction over this claim
473
 and is required to 
establish a standing claims commission to settle all third party claims for personal injury, 
illness or death arising from or attributable directly to MINUSTAH's conduct.
474
 Although 
MINUSTAH personnel enjoy civil and criminal immunity from Haitian courts, pre-
mentioned provision ensures that this immunity shall not deprive the victims of a remedy for 
harms resulting from the conduct of MINUSTAH personnel. However, the UN breached its 




    In addition, the UN’s reckless and negligent conduct breached MINUSTAH's obligations 
under Article IV, para 5 SOFAH, which provides that MINUSTAH shall respect all local 
rules and regulations.
476
 As presented by the Petition for Relief, the local law of Haiti which 
has been violated is the Civil Code of Haiti, inter alia, with regard to the obligation to 
compensate injuries resulting from negligence, including negligent transmission of disease. 
Agreement against pre-mentioned law is contrary to public policy.
477
 Furthermore, the 
Haitian penal code has been violated as well, criminalizing involuntary homicide and injury 
resulting from negligence or a failure to follow regulations.
478
 The UN also infringed the 
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obligation of control of communicable diseases in accordance with international conventions 
under Article V, para. 23 of SOFAH by not taking required measures to control cholera 
virus.
479
      
    As mentioned above, the UN and the MINUSTAH failed to comply with international 
conventions - which were required to be complied with under SOFAH - and HR, and thereby 
violated victims' fundamental rights including, inter alia, the right to life as provided for in 
Article 6 (1) of ICCPR
480
, and Article 3 of UDHR
481
 and the right to health as articulated in 
article 12 (1) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
482
, Article 25 
of the UDHR
483
, Article 24 of the CRC
484
.  
    As discussed in preceding sections, under Article VIII Section 29 of CPINU, the UN is 
obliged to protect victims' right to an effective remedy under international law through 
providing a dispute settlement mechanism, and this way reflected in para. 55 SOFAH. 
However, the UN has failed to comply with this provision as well. 
    All in all, Petition for Relief demands that the UN install a national water and sanitation 
system that will control the cholera epidemic; redress individual victims of the cholera 
outbreak for their losses; and issue a public apology for its wrongful conducts.485  
 
3-2-1 United Nations' Response to the Petition for Relief Claim     
On 21 December 2011, the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN acknowledged that the UN had 
received the complaint and was in the process of reviewing it.
486
 Regarding UN's privileges 
                                                           
479  SOFAH, op. cit. p. 256, Article. V, para. 23. It provides: "MINUSTAH and the Government shall cooperate with respect 
to sanitary services and shall extend to each other the fullest cooperation in matters concerning health, particularly with 
respect to the control of communicable diseases, in accordance with international conventions"; see Petition for Relief, op. 
cit. pp. 23-24. 
480 ICCPR, op. cit. Article 6 (1). It reads: "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by 
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life".  
481 UDHR, op. cit. Article 3 read that "[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of person".  
482 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 19 December 1966, Adopted by the General Assembly 
of the United Nations, Article 12 (1). Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/cescr.pdf, This 
Article provides: "The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health". 
483 UDHR, op. cit. Article 25. It reads: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well- being 
of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right 
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control".  
484 CRC, op. cit. Article 24. It provides: "1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall strive 
to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to such health care services. 2. States Parties shall pursue full 
implementation of this right and, in particular, shall take appropriate measures: […]; (b) To ensure the provision of 
necessary medical assistance and health care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health care; (c) To 
combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application 
of readily available technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into 
consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution; […]".  
485 Cholera Litigation, op. cit. 
486 Acknowledgement from Office of Legal affairs, 21 December 2011. Available at: http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2012/08/petition-for-releif-Claim-for-Compensation.jpg.   
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and immunities, the Office of Legal affairs stated that "[n]othing herein or relating to this 
matter shall be deemed a waiver, express or implied, of any of the privileges and immunities 
of the United Nations, including its subsidiary organs".
487
 
     However, unfortunately, on 21February 2013, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, 
Patricia O' Brien, dismissed the claim and stated that this claim considered a review of 
political and policy matters. Thus, pursuant to the Section 29 CPIUN, these claims are not 
receivable.
488
 On 7 May 2013, lawyers of the petitioners
489
 challenged the UN’s dismissal 
and stated that the UN's response does not explain how the claims entail a review of political 
and policy matters and also does not refer to any international or domestic law authority 
supporting the contention that such a review renders the claims 'not receivable'.
490
 They 
added that in the absence of further information, UN's response to the claims under section 29 
of the CPIUN is arbitrary, self-serving and contrary to international principles of due 
process.
491
 The Legal Counsel of the UN, nevertheless, upheld its positions and replied to the 
letter of 7 May 2013 by a letter dated 5 July 2013, reiterating that the claims are not 
receivable. It held that there is no legal basis for the UN either to establish a standing claim 
commission, or to get involved in a mediation process in respect of the claims as such.
492
 
    Thus, the UN and its subsidiary organ, MINUSTAH, denied responsibility for causing the 
cholera epidemic in Haiti and they have taken no action to redress the victims or otherwise 
provide any form of legally-required remedies. Thereby, pursuing a legal action in a domestic 





                                                           
487 Ibid. 
488 UN dismissal of claim, 21 February 2013, Available at: http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/UN-Dismissal-
2013-02-21.pdf.  
489 Attorneys of the petitioners are Mario Joesph, Av.from BAI, Brian Concannon, Jr., Esq. from IJDH, and Ira Kurzban, 
Esq. from law firm Kurzban Kurzban Weinger Tetzeli & Pratt P.A. 
490 Challenge to UN dismissal, 7 May 2013,Available at: http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Cholera-Victims-
Response-to-UN-Final.pdf.     
491 Ibid. 
492 Letter from United Nations Legal Counsel, dated 5 July 2013, to the cholera victims' lawyers, Available at:  
http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf; It is noticeable that UN Secretary-General  Ban Ki-
Moon in response to U.S Congress letter dated 30 May 2013 concerning the cholera situation in Haiti, reiterated that cholera 
victims' claims are not receivable and discussed funding for the UN's cholera eradication project. In fact, no 
acknowledgment of introducing cholera into Haiti by the UN has been made. Letter dated 5 July 2013 from the Secretary-
General to congresswoman, Available at: http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/UNSG-Letter-to-Rep.-Maxine-
Waters.pdf.    
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3-3 Lawsuit against the United Nations in a National Court and challenge of the United 
Nation's immunity  
On 9 October 2013, plaintiff's lawyers took legal action against the UN, MINUSTAH, Ban 
Ki-Moon (Secretary-General of the UN)
493
, and Edmond Mulet (former Under-Secretary-
General for the MINUSTAH) in NY Federal Court.
494
 It is worthwhile to note that Plaintiffs 
Delama Georges and Others, through and by their lawyers, filed a Class action complaint on 
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated in the same condition ('the Class').
495
 
Notably, enforcement of victims ' (plaintiffs' and members of proposed class's) rights are 
protected under New York law, the U.S. constitution, international law and Haitian law.
496
 
All facts, demands and allegations are the same as stated in the Petition for relief, but more 
comprehensive and voluminous.  The process of the complaint, the issue of jurisdiction and 
venue, and the alleged injuries are not covered here since they go beyond what the space 
limitation on this thesis allows for;
497
 but the issue how the lawyers intend to get around the 
immunity of the UN is of crucial importance. 
 
3-3-1 Challenging United Nation's Immunity  
As discussed in preceding sections, the UN and its officials enjoy immunity
498
 unless an 
express waiver has been made by them. However, the lawyers of the victims have alleged 
that the UN, including MINUSTAH, has waived its immunity since it has not establish a 
venue for plaintiffs to pursue legal remedies
499
 – they have not taken any action to 
compensate the victims of the cholera epidemic or otherwise provide legally-required 
                                                           
493 It is worthwhile to mention that Ban Ki-Moon, as the UN Secretary-General, "has and had overall responsibility for the 
management of the UN and its operations, including all operations in Haiti. Pursuant to Article 97 of the Charter of the UN, 
the Secretary-General is 'the chief administrative officer of the organization'." Cholera Complaint, p. 6, para. 21; also see 
Ibid, p. 59, para. 271. Notably, Ban Ki-Moon, in an interview with AL Jazeera on March 7 2013 stated that it was his 
personal decision to deny victims of cholera outbreak a remedy. Ibid, p. 41, para, 179.     
494 Cholera Complaint, op. cit., p. 1.  
495 Cholera Complaint, op. cit., p. 1; for more information regarding Class Action see ibid. pp. 8-12, para. 26-37. 
496 Cholera Complaint, op. cit. p. 42, para. 183.  
497 For further reading about facts, demands and allegations and for information concerning the process of the complaint, the 
issue of jurisdiction and venue, and the alleged injuries see Ibid., pp. 1-67; For information related to the plaintiffs ' Motion 
for affirmation that service has been made on defendant see Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Affirmation that Service Has Been Made, or in the Alternative, for Service of Process by Alternative Means and to Extend 
the Time to Effectuate Service (Memorandum of Law hereinafter), 4 February 2014, Available at:  http://www.ijdh.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/Memorandum-for-Proper-Service-2-4-2013-Final.pdf; also see Brief of Amici Curiae Fanm 
Ayisyen Nan Miyami, Inc. and the Haitian Lawyers Association in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Affirmation that Sevice 
Has Been Made on Defendants, 21 February 2014, Available at:  http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/DE-19-1-
Proposed-Amicus-Brief.pdf.   
498 The UN including its subsidiary, MINUSTAH, enjoys immunity under UNC and CPIUN; Edmond Mulet, former Under-
Secretary-General for the MINUSTAH, and Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, are similarly immune from legal process and 
suit pursuant to the UNC, CPIUN, and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 18 April 1961,  Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1964/06/19640624%2002-10%20AM/Ch_III_3p.pdf    





 failed to establish a standing claims commission, under SOFAH, to hear 
plaintiffs' claims;
501
 and also failed to provide any mode of settlement for cholera-based 
claims under CPIUN.
502
 Interestingly, by a letter dated 2 July 2013, the UN confirmed that 
the UN will not comply with its legal obligations to provide a remedy to members of the 
proposed Class and plaintiffs.
503
 Thus, as mentioned before, since the UN's refusal of 
responsibility is not justified under relevant international law, comparative law, or the UN's 
own treaties and documents that establish its legal obligation,
504
 pursuing a lawsuit in a court 
of law is the only option left for the plaintiffs to seek their right protected under New York 
law, the U.S Constitution, international law and Haitian law.
505
 However, the U.S Attorney 
has argued on behalf of the UN in the Statement of Interest that the UN has repeatedly and 
expressly asserted its and it official's absolute immunity and the issue whether the UN has 
established a standing claims commission or a venue for plaintiffs to pursue legal remedies is 
irrelevant to the question of waiver.
506
      
    The lawyers have also argued that the UN implicitly waived its immunity from service of 
process
507
 by appearing to accept service at UN headquarters as representatives from the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs informed the process server that the UN would accept service by mail 
or facsimile and then provided the process server a facsimile number to which the process 
could be faxed.
508
 It therefore appears that the UN, which is immune from any process of 
lawsuit including service process, has waived it immunity by accepting service. The 
Statement of Interest, nevertheless, argues that "the UN disputes that any responsible or duly 
authorized officer of the United Nations accepted service of process or provided any advice 
on how process may be served against the United Nations or its officials. But even assuming, 
arguendo, that a UN employee did provide instructions to a process server, such instructions 
did not constitute an 'express […] waive[r]' of the UN's absolute immunity 'from every form 
of legal process'."
509
   
                                                           
500 Ibid. p. 40, para. 173. 
501 Ibid. p. 40, para. 174. 
502 Ibid. p. 40, para. 175. 
503 Ibid. p. 42, para. 182; see also  Letter from United Nations Legal Counsel, dated 5 July 2013, op. cit.   
504 Cholera Complaint, op. cit. p. 41, para. 180. 
505 Ibid. p. 42, para. 183. 
506  Statement of Interest, U.S. Department of Justice, United States Attorney, Southern District of NY, Re: George v. United 
Nations, et al., 13 Civ. 7146 (JPO), 7 March 2014, pp. 5-6. All pleadings in the case are also available on Public Access to 
Court Electronic Records. Pacer, under case number 1:13-CV-07146. 
507 Service of process means "delivery of a writ, summons, or other legal papers to the person required to respond to them. 
Process is the general term for the legal document by which a lawsuit is started and the court asserts its jurisdiction over the 
parties and the controversy". http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Service+of+Process.  
508 Memorandum of Law, op.cit. p. 7. 
509 Statement of Interest, op. cit. Footnote, p. 9. 
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    This case is still in process and therefore there is currently little case law supporting the 
arguments against the UN's immunity. However, it would seem that if it is proved that the 


































Chapter 7: Conclusions 
Contemporary PSOs include different actors holding different roles and functions. Both the 
UN and TCSs are important primary actors on the international level. They are also bound by 
HR obligations following from different legal basis. SEAs committed by the personnel of 
PSOs, as an internationally wrongful conduct, might be attributable to both of them and thus 
they may both incur international responsibility.  
     ECC is the main factor which establishes attribution of internationally wrongful conduct 
committed by the personnel of UN PSOs, to either the UN or TCSs. In fact, in the context of a 
PSO, responsibility for the UN/TCSs arises where the UN/TCSs exercises their jurisdiction. 
PSOs are subsidiary organs of the UN over which the UN exercises some degree of ECC. 
Likewise, jurisdiction of TCSs arises, as Frostad observes, when they inter alia exercise 
effective command and control over a foreign territory, inter alia through their troops sent to 
a PSO, notwithstanding the temporary nature of such control.
510
 Dual responsibility may 
therefore exist where both the UN and the TCS exercise an amount of ECC over PSO forces. 
The degree of ECC might, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each 
specific case. Thus, SEAs committed by the personnel of such forces may be attributable to 
both, or merely one of them. 
    Where the UN incurs responsibility, redressing victims of SEAs, women and children in 
particular, should be given much more attention than it currently does. However, it seems that 
the UN only undertakes the burden of assisting and supporting the victims in order for them to 
seek compensation somewhere else, and does not accept itself international responsibility for 
the misconduct of its personnel and consequently does not try to redress the victims itself. 
And to date, the UN has not even implemented the assistance and support policy. 
    Moreover, according to Article VII Model SOFA and Article VIII CPIUN, the UN should 
arrange appropriate modes of settlement for non-contractual claims, such as those arising 
from SEAs committed by its personnel, through internal mechanism, namely, standing claims 
commission. But, the UN has mostly failed to comply with this obligation as was shown in 
the Cholera Complaint.  
    Therefore, it appears that filing a lawsuit against the UN is often the only way left open for 
the victims in order to seek redress. This way nevertheless comes with its own restrictions and 
obstacles, e.g. the UN's and its officials' absolute immunity from jurisdiction. Basically, it is 
                                                           
510 Frostad, Magne (2011) op. cit. pp.141-142; Council of Europe, ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Loizidou Case hereinafter) 
(Preliminary Objections) Application No. 15318/89, 25 March 1995, 1-39,p.18, para. 62, Available at: 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57920#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57920%22]}; see also 
ECtHR, Loizidou Case (1996) (Grand Chamber), op. cit. p.17, para. 52. 
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not possible to take legal action against the UN and its officials unless such immunity had 
been expressly waived. The proof of the latter seems crucial as shown in the Cholera 
Complaint. Thus, due to the lack of a proper mechanism for compensations, eradication of 
SEAs committed during PSOs should be put towards the top of the UN's agenda. 
To eradicate SEAs, the internal policy of the UN concerning the prohibition of SEAs, which 
is reflected in a zero-tolerance policy and the S.G. Bulletin
511
, should be strictly enforced. 
However, not all troop contingents were fully supportive of these policies.
512
 While the issue 
of SEAs has been addressed in numerous UNSC resolutions, UN reports and press accounts 
include allegations of SEAs and official inaction continue to increase.
513
 Therefore, if the UN 
is truly to live up to its promise regarding the eradication of SEAs, the will of both TCSs and 
the UN itself is required.  
    Under UNSC resolution 1888
514
, TCSs are required to properly investigate allegations of 
sexual violence.
515
The UN could also impose sanctions, withdraw contingents, and blacklist 
States which fail to take legally effective action against perpetrators.
516
 Furthermore, TCSs 
are urged to take due precautions in vetting candidates for national armies to ensure that those 
guilty of SEAs are excluded.
517
 TCSs are also required to take appropriate measures, which 
includes enforcing military discipline, to protect women and children from all forms of 
SEAs.
518
 In addition, TCSs are responsible for ensuring adequate training of their troops
519
 
and they are recommended to deploy a great number of female personnel in PSOs including 
civil, military and police functions.
520
  
    All in all, it is crucial that abuse is eliminated, that perpetrators are punished, and that 
victims are compensated. It seems that in order to achieve the latter, it is important to find 
ways to penetrate the UN immunity “stone wall”. As Tondini states, a successful option in the 
long term could be that of either "establishing real external and independent claims settlement 
mechanisms (which may secure access to justice for third parties – individuals and legal 
persons – while being also truly independent from the international organization concerned), 
                                                           
511 Initially, only UN staff members were expressly bound by the prohibition in the S.G Bulletin. However, these standards 
have now been incorporated into the contracts, letters of engagement, and undertakings of all personnel. Moreover, UN staff 
regulation have been amended in order for it to clarify that SEAs are considered as a serious misconduct and may result in 
disciplinary action such as dismissal. Defeis, Elizabeth F., op. cit. pp. 195- 196.   
512 Ibid. p. 212. 
513 Ibid. p. 214. 
514 UNSC Resolution 1888, adopted in its 6195th meeting, 30 December 2009, UN Doc. S/RES/1888, 1- 7. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/securitycouncil/S-RES-1888-%282009%29-English.pdf  
515 Ibid. p. 4, para. 7.  
516 Defeis, Elizabeth F., op. cit. p. 214; see also Burke, Roisin, op. cit. pp. 13-14. 
517 UNSC Resolution 1888, op. cit. p. 4, para. 3.    
518  Ibid. 
519 Ibid. 
520  Ibid. p. 6 para. 19; see also ibid. p. 2. 
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or putting international organizations' activity under the scrutiny of international 
courts/supervisory bodies of human rights".
521
 Finally, to compensate victims and at some 
stage in the future hopefully eliminate SEAs, rhetoric must now be translated into action.   
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